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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, individuals who lack biological or adoptive
links to children whom they have helped raise have repeatedly asked courts
for the opportunity to establish that it would be in the children’s best
interests for them to be awarded custody and visitation.1 Many of these
cases have arisen in the context of dissolving relationships between
unmarried partners (frequently, though not always, same-sex ones).2
*

Professor of Law & Judge Frederick Lacey Scholar, Rutgers University School of
Law (Newark). This Article is dedicated to Harry Krause, my former colleague at the
University of Illinois College of Law, whose scholarship was instrumental in ending
decades of legal discrimination against children born outside of marriage. I would like
to thank Richard Storrow for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.
1. See sources cited infra notes 3-4.
2. See id.
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Appellate courts in several jurisdictions have allowed unmarried partners
the opportunity to show that they established, with the legal parents’
consent, parental bonds with the children and that it would be in the
minors’ best interests for those relationships to continue.3 In contrast,
appellate courts in other jurisdictions have refused to grant standing in
these types of cases.4 Some of these courts have done so on the ground that
legislatures are better able than courts to account for the many factors
involved in determining who should have standing in custody and visitation
cases.5 From this perspective, if the custody and visitation statutes do not
provide standing to former unmarried partners, courts should not do so on
their own.6
Other courts have relied on the constitutional rights of legal parents to
deny standing to former partners in custody and visitation cases.7 These
courts have concluded that, unless the legal parents are unfit or neglectful,8

3. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67, 2011 WL 553923 (Feb. 17, 2011); In
re Interest of E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 553 (Colo. App. 2004); King v. S.B. (In re
Parentage of A.B.), 837 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. 2005); Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317
S.W.3d 569, 576-77 (Ky. 2010); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004);
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539,
550 (N.J. 2000); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 65 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); T.B. v.
L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 888 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001);
Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 967 (R.I. 2000); Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage
of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody
of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 437 (Wis. 1995). Although most of these courts relied
on their equitable powers to grant standing, custody and visitation statutes in some
jurisdictions are broad enough to provide standing to the former partners of legal
parents under some circumstances. See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c)
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-59, 46b-56 (2011); MINN STAT. § 257C.01-08
(2010).
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 2009), superseded by statute,
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6) (2009); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d
669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc); A.B. v. H.L. (In re Visitation with
C.B.L.), 723 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d
73, 87 (Md. 2008); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Debra
H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 188 (N.Y. 2010); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 815 (Utah 2007); Stadter v. Spirko, 661 S.E.2d
494, 498-99 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
5. See, e.g., A.B., 723 N.E.2d at 321 (suggesting that a legislative solution is
necessary because of the complex social significance of the visitation issue); Jones, 154
P.3d at 817 (noting that courts do not have access to the same investigative tools as
legislatures, and therefore cannot determine policy as well).
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 671 (“[U]nder the privacy provision in the
Florida Constitution, a third party . . . cannot be granted by statute the right to visitation
with minor children, because, absent evidence of a demonstrable harm to the child,
such a grant unconstitutionally interferes with a natural parent’s privacy right to rear
his or her child.”) (footnote and citation omitted); Janice M., 948 A.2d at 74-75
(holding that the constitutional rights of parents to control their children’s upbringing
trump the rights of de facto parents in the absence of exceptional circumstances);.
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
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they enjoy a constitutional right to cut off all contact between their children
and so-called “third parties,”9 that is, individuals who have neither
biological nor adoptive links to the children.
A third rationale for denying standing to former partners in parenting
cases focuses on considerations of certainty.10 From this perspective, the
use of equitable parenthood doctrines (such as de facto parenthood,
psychological parenthood, and in loco parentis) to grant standing opens up
a Pandora’s Box of uncertainties, requiring case-by-case factual
determinations of whether particular individuals established sufficiently
close relationships with particular children to justify their being permitted
to seek custody and visitation.11 This uncertainty, it is argued, is harmful to
children because legal parents are unable to determine ex ante which of the
adults whom they permit to establish relationships with their children will
be able to claim parentage status in the future.12 It is also argued that
granting standing to individuals who lack biological or adoptive links to the
children is harmful to them because it engenders protracted litigation.13
This Article assesses the certainty-based objections to granting custody
and visitation standing to the former partners of legal parents. Those
objections were the principal reasons why the New York Court of Appeals,
in its recent decision of Debra H. v. Janice R., reaffirmed the bright-line
rule it adopted twenty years earlier in Alison D. v. Virginia M.,14 namely,
that an individual who lacks biological or adoptive links to the child cannot
be deemed a parent.15 It also appears that certainty considerations were the
9. In this Article, I sometimes use quotation marks around “third parties” because,
although courts frequently use that term to describe individuals who lack biological or
adoptive links to children, see, e.g., Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 671; Janice M., 948 A.2d
at 81, it fails to capture the close parental relationship that many former partner
litigants had with the children prior to the dissolution of their relationships with the
legal parents. See Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67, 2011 WL 553923, at *8-9 (Feb. 12,
2011) (holding that the constitutional rights of legal parents limit the rights of
grandparents but not of individuals, including former same-sex partners, who
established parental relationships with the children).
10. See, e.g., Jones, 154 P.3d at 816 (noting that a de facto parent rule “rests upon
ambiguous and fact-intensive inquiries” that “do[] not fulfill the traditional gatekeeping function of rules of standing”). Certainty considerations were also the main
reason why the New York Court of Appeals recently refused to rely on its equitable
powers to grant former partners standing to seek custody and visitation. Debra H. v.
Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 193 (N.Y. 2010). I discuss this aspect of Debra H. in infra
notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 81-101, 112-119 and accompanying text.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991); see infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
15. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 193 (rejecting a flexible parenthood rule in favor of
Alison D.’s bright-line rule because the former would cause uncertainty for parents
regarding when third parties would “reach the tipping point” and gain rights in the
upbringing of the children).
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main reasons why the Debra H. court created an exception to this brightline rule by granting standing to petitioners who entered into legally
recognized relationships with the legal parents.16
The certainty concerns raised by the Debra H. court are superficially
appealing because it is generally more difficult to establish, as a factual
matter, whether someone has attained the status of a functional parent
under equitable parenthood principles than it is to determine whether
someone is the child’s biological or adoptive parent, or whether the two
adults in question entered into a legally recognized relationship.17 I argue
in this Article, however, that concerns regarding uncertainty in the
application of equitable parenthood doctrines are greatly overblown18 and
that whatever gains in certainty may accompany a narrow understanding of
parenthood that is linked exclusively to (1) biology or (2) adoption or (3)
the entering into a legally recognized relationship do not outweigh the harm
to children that follow a categorical refusal to recognize the parentage
status of individuals who have helped to raise them with the consent and
encouragement of their legal parents.19
Since the New York Court of Appeals has been the court of last resort
that has been the most explicit in defending a narrow definition of
parenthood based on certainty considerations, I focus much of my attention
in this Article on parenting law developments in New York. The
implications of my arguments, however, go beyond developments in that
state.
I begin in Part I by providing a brief history of how the New York Court
of Appeals has tackled, in three important rulings, the question of who is
entitled to seek standing in parenting cases. In doing so, I criticize the
court for improperly distinguishing between custody and visitation
disputes. I also criticize it for failing to distinguish between cases in which
legal parents agree to raise children jointly with other individuals and cases
in which they do not.
In Part II, I explore the court’s ruling in Debra H., paying particular
attention to the emphasis that the majority opinion—and two concurring

16. See infra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
17. I here use “functional parent” to describe an individual who gains parentage

status through the application of equitable doctrines such as de facto parenthood,
psychological parenthood, and in loco parentis. Although there can be some
differences in the ways these doctrines are understood and applied, those differences
are not relevant to this Article. For a detailed discussion of the different functional
parenthood theories, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 458, 491-522 (1990).
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part V.
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opinions—gave to certainty considerations.20 In Part III, I question the
New York Court of Appeals’ assertion in Debra H. that its decisions in
parenting cases in the last twenty years have created a great deal of
certainty and predictability.21 I also in Part III question that same court’s
claim that multi-part functional parenthood tests, such as the one adopted
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,22 are unworkable and unpredictable.
In Part IV, I compare the doctrine of functional parenthood with that of
intent-based parenthood, and argue that a standing rule which only looks to
the parties’ pre-conception intent cannot satisfactorily resolve all disputes
over who may seek custody and visitation in former partner parenting
cases.23 I then, in Part V, provide a normative critique of the preference for
legal certainty and predictability over the protection of relationships that
children have established with individuals whom they consider their
parents.24 In doing so, I describe how considerations of certainty played an
important role in the legal privileging of so-called legitimate children over
illegitimate ones in decades past. I then explain how courts, when they
prioritize certainty in adjudication over all other values in parenting
standing cases, create a new class of illegitimate children.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I explain how the recognition of same-sex
marriage by states like New York has brought us back full-circle to the
question of illegitimacy.25 Children raised by married same-sex couples
who lack biological or adoptive links with one of those individuals will
likely benefit from having the law recognize the parental status of both
adults.26 Yet, a state’s recognition of same-sex marriage does nothing to
help children raised by same-sex couples who choose not to marry.27 We
need to be careful, therefore, that the recognition of same-sex marriage
does not lead us back to the days when our society denied children benefits
because of their being born and raised out of wedlock.
I. NEW YORK PARENTING CASES BEFORE DEBRA H. V. JANICE R.
The current troubling state of parentage law in New York has its origins
in Bennett v. Jeffreys, an otherwise unimpeachable New York Court of

20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421

(Wis. 1995).
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Conclusion.
26. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
27. See id.
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Appeals decision from 1976.28 Bennett involved a custody petition filed by
a twenty-three year old mother who was seeking to regain custody of her
child.29 Eight years earlier, the then teenage mother (with her parents’
encouragement) informally and voluntarily turned over custody of her
newborn to a friend of the family.30 After the mother became an adult, she
filed for custody, over the objection of the friend of the family who had
cared for the child for several years.31
Each of the two lower courts in Bennett adopted different bright-line
rules. The trial court held that when a nonparent has informal custody of
the child for an extended period of time, she is entitled to keep custody.32
In contrast, the intermediate appellate court held that a third party could
never seek (or retain) custody over the objections of a legal parent.33
The Court of Appeals rejected both of these polar positions and instead
ruled that third parties could seek custody of children in cases in which
“extraordinary circumstances” were present.34 In doing so, the court made
clear that the rights of legal parents must sometimes give way in order to
protect the children’s interests. As the court put it:
The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a
parent to the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary
circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the
best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right.
Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the
best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right
of parental custody.35

Bennett has become a leading case in New York family law because it
introduced the “extraordinary circumstances” doctrine, one that has
received much attention from courts and commentators.36 But, as Professor
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 284 (“In reaching its conclusion that the child should remain with the
nonparent custodian, the Family Court relied primarily upon the seven-year period of
custody by the nonparent and evidently on the related testimony of a psychologist.”).
33. Id. (“[T]he Appellate Division, in awarding custody to the mother, too
automatically applied the primary principle that a parent is entitled to the custody of the
child.”).
34. Id. at 281 (noting that examples of such circumstances include “surrender,
abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption
of custody over an extended period of time”).
35. Id.
36. Martin Guggenheim, Rediscovering Third Party Visitation Under the Common
Law in New York: Some Uncommon Answers, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153,
167 (2009) (noting that the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” has dominated the
field since Bennett v. Jeffries).
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Martin Guggenheim has argued, the ruling in Bennett was not particularly
novel because it was entirely consistent with decades of New York
common law parenting decisions that preceded it. Indeed, “[h]ad Bennett
simply applied well-worn common law principles, the court could have
reached the same result, reminding everyone that common law courts have
the power to award custody to non-parents over a fit parent’s objection
provided such an order was essential to the child’s welfare.”37
The problematic parenthood rulings by the New York Court of Appeals
began, then, not with Bennett, but with cases that followed it. In those
cases, the court improperly distinguished between custody and visitation
disputes.38 The court also failed to properly distinguish between what I
would designate as true third party cases—those in which the petitioner
seeking standing did not jointly raise the child with the legal parent—from
cases in which the petitioner helped raise the child alongside the legal
parent.39 I discuss both of these points below.
A. Custody vs. Visitation
A little over a decade after Bennett, the New York Court of Appeals, in
Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., was faced with the question of whether the
extraordinary circumstances doctrine applied to visitation disputes.40
Ronald and Cindy, who never married, were in a relationship for most of
the period between 1979 and 1983, except for a few months in late 1981
when Cindy dated another man and became pregnant by him.41 After the
couple reunited in 1982, Ronald attended childbirth classes with the
expectant mother, was present during childbirth, agreed to be listed as the
father on the child’s birth certificate, saw the child regularly for several
months, and considered himself to be the child’s father.42 The couple

37. Id. (internal reference and footnote omitted). Guggenheim adds that

No one can doubt that the common law weighted parental rights heavily. But
this weighting was applied substantively when courts had to rule for one party
or the other. The common law would not deny individuals the opportunity to
persuade a court that it should intervene to protect a child or to enter an order
superseding a parent’s view on child-rearing. Winning was difficult for the
non-parent, but getting to court was not.
Id. at 158-59 (footnote omitted) (second emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987) (declining
to apply Bennett because visitation, not custody, was at issue).
39. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28-29 (N.Y. 1991)
(rejecting the argument that petitioner’s care of the child, while sharing family home
with the child’s legal parent, granted her standing to seek visitation).
40. Ronald FF., 511 N.E.2d at 76.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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eventually broke up and Ronald sought visitation rights.43
The trial court concluded (1) that Bennett’s extraordinary circumstances
test should be applied; (2) that such circumstances existed in the case; and
(3) that it would be in the child’s best interests if visitation was granted.44
The intermediate appellate court affirmed,45 but the New York Court of
Appeals reversed after holding that the Bennett doctrine was unavailable to
nonparents in visitation cases.46 The court noted that
visitation is a subspecies of custody, but the differences in degree in
these relational categories is so great and so fundamental that rules like
the Bennett rule, which have been carefully crafted and made available
only to custody disputes, should not be casually extended to the
visitation field. Thus, we expressly decline to do so.47

Although the court was undoubtedly correct that there are important
differences between custody and visitation, those differences do not
support its conclusion that the extraordinary circumstances doctrine applies
in custody cases but not in visitation ones. In fact, an argument can be
made that the opposite should be the case. This is because granting
custody to a non-legal parent constitutes a greater interference with the
discretion of legal parents to determine what is best for their children than
does the granting of visitation rights.48 As a result, it can be argued that it
should be more (rather than less) difficult for someone claiming to be a
non-legal parent to acquire custodial rights than visitation rights.49
Martin Guggenheim has noted that, unlike Bennett v. Jeffreys, Ronald
FF. “is a striking departure from the well-established common law rule [in
New York] that courts have the authority to grant visitation to a non-parent
over a fit parent’s objection when such visitation is essential to the child’s
well-being.”50 This departure is particularly surprising given the lack of
explanation in Ronald FF. of why visitation cases should be treated
differently from custody ones.51
A lower New York court has explained the “legal dichotomy” of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 502 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div. 1986).
Ronald FF., 511 N.E.2d at 77.
Id.
See Guggenheim, supra note 36, at 175 (“[U]ndeniably the interference [with
parental prerogatives that visitation exacts] is less great than an order denying custody
outright to a parent.”).
49. Id. at 169 (“[S]ince visitation represents a lesser intrusion compared with the
outright denial of custody, courts should be permitted to order visitation based on a less
compelling basis than would be needed to award custody.”).
50. Id. at 174.
51. Id. at 175 (arguing that the Ronald FF. ruling lacks both “analysis and
reasoning”).
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allowing standing under the extraordinary circumstances doctrine for
custody but not for visitation as follows: “If a parent is so unfit that he or
she cannot take care of a child, the interests of the child require that there
must be a way for someone else to become legally charged with caring for
that child in a custodial situation—not simply intermittently through
visitation.”52 This explanation, however, does not support the holding in
Ronald FF. Although it is of course sensible to create a mechanism
whereby a third party may seek custody when the legal parent is unable or
unwilling to care for a child, that reasoning does not explain why it should
be easier to seek custody than visitation.
I want to make it clear that I am not arguing that it should necessarily be
more difficult for a so-called “third party” to seek custody than visitation
over the objections of a legal parent. There is a good argument to be made
that standing rules should be the same in both custody and visitation
cases.53 My point is simply that if there is going to be a difference in the
standing rules for custody and visitation cases, it makes sense for it to be
more difficult for third parties to seek the former than the latter. At the end
of the day, it is illogical for the Court of Appeals to have recognized in
Bennett that courts have the authority to grant custody to third parties even
when the legal parent is fit, but then to have held in Ronald FF. that courts
lack the same power in visitation cases.54
B. “True” Third Parties vs. Co-Parents
Bennett involved a custody dispute between a true third party and a legal
parent. As already noted, by “true” third party I mean someone who did
not jointly raise the child with the legal parent. The New York Court of
Appeals’ inability or unwillingness to distinguish cases in which (the party
claiming to be) a non-legal parent helped raise the child alongside her legal
parent from cases in which the party seeking parentage status did not coparent alongside the legal parent, goes a long way in explaining its opinion
in Alison D. v. Virginia M.55 The court in that case refused to rely on
equitable principles to grant visitation standing to the former lesbian
52. Amy M. v. Leland C., No. V2438-04/04A, 2005 WL 1572083, at *4 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. June 20, 2005) (emphasis in original).
53. See Guggenheim, supra note 36, at 169 (“One of the core common law
principles (perhaps the one which has been least appreciated in recent years) was the
symmetry with which the law treated efforts to secure custody and efforts to secure
visitation.”).
54. See id. at 176 (“In light of Bennett’s concern with the consequences for
children of severing relationships with parent-like adults, Ronald FF. is irrational.”);
see also id. at 179 (noting “the bizarre result” that in New York, “it is easier for courts
to award custody of a child to a non-parent over the parents’ objection than it is to
award visitation of a child to a non-parent over the parents’ objection”).
55. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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partner of a biological mother who, with the latter’s consent and
encouragement, helped raise the child for his first two years of life.56 As
the Court of Appeals put it in Alison D., in quoting from Ronald FF. (and
in citing to Bennett), “[i]t has long been recognized that, as between a
parent and a third person, parental custody of a child may not be displaced
absent grievous cause or necessity.”57
The petitioner in Alison D. was not similarly situated to the “third
parties” in Bennett and Ronald FF. because she had jointly parented the
child alongside the legal parent.58 As a result, the “third party” label did
not fit the Alison D. petitioner in the same way that it did in Bennett (in
which the party opposing the biological parent’s custody petition was a
friend of the family)59 and in Ronald FF. (in which the party seeking
visitation was not involved in raising the child).60
According to the court’s reasoning in Alison D., it is necessary to deny
individuals who lack biological or adoptive links to children the
opportunity to seek visitation because to rule otherwise “would necessarily
impair the [legal] parents’ right to custody and control.”61 What the court
failed to understand was that those rights are properly limited when the
legal parent voluntarily agrees to raise the child jointly with another person
and encourages that individual to establish a parental bond with the child.
Indeed, several courts have recognized that when a legal parent consents
to and fosters a parental relationship between her partner and the child, she
is no longer free to unilaterally sever that relationship if doing so would be
inconsistent with the child’s best interests.62 Rather than assume, as the
56. Id. at 28; see also CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT
FAMILIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD 83-94 (2012) (providing a
detailed discussion of the background and reasoning of Alison D.).
57. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (quoting Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75
(N.Y. 1987)) (emphasis added). The fact that the legal parent in Alison D. consented to
and fostered the formation of a parent-like relationship between her (then) partner and
the child was irrelevant because legal parents, in the court’s view, have a right to
change their minds regarding who associates with their children. As the court put it,
“in this State it is the child’s mother and father who, assuming fitness, have the right to
the care and custody of their child, even in situations where the nonparent has exercised
some control over the child with the parents’ consent.” Id.
58. Id. at 28 (noting that for the first two years of the child’s life, both parties
provided care for and made decisions regarding the child).
59. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976).
60. Ronald FF., 511 N.E.2d at 76.
61. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
62. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (“By virtue of her own
actions, the legal parent’s expectation of autonomous privacy in her relationship with
her child is necessarily reduced from that which would have been the case had she
never invited the third party into their lives. Most important, where that invitation and
its consequences have altered her child’s life by essentially giving him or her another
parent, the legal parent’s options are constrained.”); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58,
69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (“A parent has the absolute control and ability to maintain a
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Alison D. court did, that children’s interests are always served best by
granting legal parents the unilateral right to terminate (at any time) the
relationships between the children and other adults who helped raise them,
these courts have recognized that the severing of all contact between
children and individuals whom they consider to be their parents can harm
them regardless of whether they share biological or adoptive links with
those adults.63
Alison D. was distinguishable from Bennett and Ronald FF. because the
legal parent in the latter two cases never agreed to co-parent with the party
who later claimed parentage status. This difference is crucial because it
highlights how the initial wishes of legal parents create parental
expectations in their children. Once a legal parent agrees to co-parent a
child with someone else, and that person functions as a parent for a
significant period of time, the child comes to view both adults as her
parents.64 The recognition of functional parenthood doctrine in this context
is necessary to protect the children’s interests and expectations.65
It is important to emphasize that the sharing of parental responsibilities

zone of privacy around his or her child. However, a parent cannot maintain an absolute
zone of privacy if he or she voluntarily invites a third party to function as a parent to
the child.”) (quoting Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006));
Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (“[T]he fact that [the legal parent]
not only gave birth to this child but also nurtured him from infancy does not mean that
she can arbitrarily terminate [the petitioner’s] de facto parental relationship with the
boy, a relationship that [the former] agreed to and fostered for many years.”).
63. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 560 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[I]nherent in
the bond between child and psychological parent is the risk of emotional harm to the
child should that relationship be significantly curtailed or terminated.”); Mullins v.
Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he applicability of the doctrine of
waiver in a child custody situation is legally justified as well as necessary in order to
prevent the harm that inevitably results from the destruction of the bond that develops
between the child and the nonparent who has raised the child as his or her own.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 894 (Mass.
1999) (“The only family the child has ever known has splintered. The child is entitled
to be protected from the trauma caused by the disruption of his relationship with the
[non-legal parent].”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex
Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 695 (2005) (“The ability to
maintain a relationship with both parents in the event of the parents’ separation is
critical for children; having this ability protected by law undoubtedly has served to
prevent the wrenching spectacle of children being separated from parents with whom
they have lived and on whom they have depended for years.”); see also V.C., 748 A.2d
at 550 (“At the heart of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children
have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and
provide for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the
emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily
life.”).
65. See E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 (“[T]he best interests calculus must include an
examination of the child’s relationship with both his legal and de facto parent.”); V.C.,
748 A.2d at 550 (recognizing that children have an interest in maintaining ties to
psychological parents because such parents love and provide for them).
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can take place outside of sexually intimate relationships.66 A legal parent
may choose to co-parent with one (or presumably more) individual(s)
without being in such a relationship. The crucial factor is not the type of
relationship that existed between the adults, but is instead whether the legal
parent agreed to share parental responsibilities with another person in ways
that led the child to view both as her parents. Once it is reasonable to
believe that the child considers the non-legal parent to be a parent and that
this occurred with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, then
the former should be granted standing to seek custody and visitation.
The New York Court of Appeals had the opportunity to rectify its
misguided decision in Alison D. twenty years later in Debra H. v. Janice R.
The court, however, refused to do so.67 In reaffirming Alison D., the Debra
H. court gave some weight to the right of legal parents to decide who
associates with their children.68 But, as discussed in the next section, the
main reason why the court (again) refused to use its equitable powers to
grant standing to a former lesbian partner seeking parental rights was
because of the concern that doing so would bring a great deal of uncertainty
and unpredictability to parenting law.69
II. CERTAINTY AS THE NORMATIVE POLESTAR IN DEBRA H V. JANICE R.
The facts in the Debra H. case are similar to many other former partner
parenting cases. In seeking custody and visitation, Debra, the petitioner,
alleged that she and her partner, Janice, had together decided to start a
family by having the latter become pregnant through alternative
insemination.70 Debra also alleged that she helped choose the anonymous
sperm donor, accompanied Janice to all of the pregnancy-related medical
appointments, and was present in the delivery room when the baby was
born.71 In addition, Debra alleged that the couple represented themselves
to others as the child’s parents, that she contributed financially to support
him, and that from the time the boy was born until he was two years old,
she “performed all of the typical parenting responsibilities for a young
child . . . including[] feeding him, changing him, dressing him, reading to

66. See P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780, 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting
that the functional parenthood test is “not meant to apply only to domestic partners,
step-parents, or those third parties who lived in a ‘familial setting’ with the parent and
child”).
67. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010).
68. Id. at 193.
69. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
70. Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 9, 2008).
71. Id. at *3-4.
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him, and playing with him.”72 In seeking to have her parentage status
legally recognized, Debra also emphasized that she and Janice had entered
into a civil union in Vermont a month before the child’s birth.73
For her part, Janice denied Debra’s allegations regarding the couple’s
joint intent to raise a child together, as well as her former partner’s
contention that she had been closely involved in the raising of the child.74
Janice also claimed that she had entered into the civil union “because
petitioner insisted upon it and coerced her into it when she was eight
months pregnant.”75 Finally, the biological mother, who was an attorney,
contended that she “tolerated petitioner’s attempts to create the appearance
of a family in reliance on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Matter of
Alison D. v. Virginia [M.], which . . . she had researched and determined
precluded petitioner from claiming any rights as [the child’s] parent.”76
The trial court disagreed with Janice’s assessment of the impact of
Alison D. on her case, ruling that it was not determinative of the standing
question.77 The court also held that principles of equitable estoppel
provided Debra with standing to sue for custody and visitation.78 After the
intermediate appellate court reversed,79 the New York Court of Appeals
agreed to hear the case.
In her appeal, Debra urged the state’s high court to overrule Alison D. by
granting her standing to seek custody and visitation through the application
of the functional parenthood doctrine.80 During the oral argument, several
judges inquired whether that doctrine provided a predictable and workable
test. One of the judges, for example, expressed concern that the functional
parenting standard might “embrace step-parents, nannies, and . . . people”
other than former partners.81 Another judge wanted to know whether the
functional parenthood tests adopted by other states provided “a predictable

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6, *9.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *15-16.
Id. at *16. As we will see later in this Article, the trial court’s ruling, along
with that of several other New York courts, belies the notion, defended by the New
York Court of Appeals in Debra H., that the bright-line test announced in Alison D. has
led to a great deal of certainty in the determination of who qualifies for parentage status
in New York. See infra Part III.A.
79. Debra H. v. Janice R., 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2009).
80. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 192, 192 n.3 (N.Y. 2010).
81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5:01, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184
(2010)
(No.
10-441),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/2010/Feb10/Feb10_OA.htm.
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set of criteria that one could use to determine parenthood.”82
A third judge asked Debra’s attorney whether it was not the case that
“there is a very strong public interest in knowing who a kid’s parents
are.”83 The judge also inquired whether the attorney had a test in mind
“that would allow a great majority of children to know who their parents
are without six years of litigation on the subject.”84 That same judge later
asked the guardian ad litem, who supported Debra’s effort to gain standing,
the following question: “Aren’t bright lines good . . . when you are trying
to figure out how many parents you’ve got and who they are? . . . Isn’t it
true that for many children it is better to know the answer [of who their
parents are] than what the answer is?”85
The court’s majority opinion in Debra H., as well as two of the three
concurring opinions, reflected the concern with certainty and predictability
expressed by several judges during the oral argument. In writing for the
majority, Judge Susan Read noted that Alison D., along with a subsequent
ruling allowing unmarried partners to seek second-parent adoptions,86
“creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic
breakups otherwise fraught with the risk of ‘disruptive . . . battle[s]’ over
parentage as a prelude to further potential combat over custody and
visitation.”87 Although Judge Read acknowledged that many had criticized
Alison D. for being “formulaic, or too rigid, or out of step with the times,”
the court “remain[ed] convinced that the predictability of parental identity
fostered by Alison D. benefits children and the adults in their lives.”88
As the majority saw it, the case presented a stark choice between, on the
one hand, reaffirming “the bright-line rule in Alison D.” and, on the other,
replacing it “with a complicated and nonobjective test for determining socalled functional or de facto parentage at an equitable-estoppel hearing to
be conducted by the trial court after discovery and fact-intensive inquiry in
the individual case.”89 The court rejected the latter option because “[t]hese
hearings . . . are likely often to be contentious, costly, and lengthy.”90 The
type of adjudicative flexibility in determining who should have standing to
sue for custody and visitation that the petitioner was urging the court to
embrace, Judge Read claimed, “threatens to trap single biological and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 9:30.
Id. at 5:57.
Id. at 6:02.
Id. at 15:44.
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 191-92 (N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted).
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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adoptive parents and their children in a limbo of doubt.”91 She added that
the functional parenthood determination was “inherently unpredictable”92
because legal “parents [can]not possibly know for sure when another
adult’s level of involvement in family life might reach the tipping point and
jeopardize their right to bring up their children without the unwanted
participation of a third party.”93
For all these reasons, the court explicitly rejected the petitioner’s request
that it follow the approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.94 In
1995, that court applied a four-part test to determine when to grant
visitation standing to someone who lacks a biological or adoptive
connection to the child.95 Under that test, the petitioner must prove:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
education and development, including contributing towards the child’s
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the
petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental
in nature.96

For the New York court, this type of “complicated and nonobjective”97
test was unworkable because it led to protracted litigation and denied

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 193 n.4.
Id. at 193 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 192 n.3 & 193.
Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 437 (Wis.

1995).
96. Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted); see also In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559
(Colo. App. 2004) (“Who may be deemed a psychological parent for the purposes of
seeking and receiving an award of parental responsibilities has been variously defined.
Common to these definitions is a relationship with deep emotional bond such that the
child recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship, as a
parent from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance.”). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), defined a
de facto parent as:
One who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the
child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with
the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent,
performs a share of care taking functions at least as great as the legal parent.
The de facto parent shapes the child’s daily routine, addresses his
developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his education and
medical care, and serves as a moral guide.
Id. at 891.
97. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 192.
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children the benefits of knowing which individuals are their parents.98 A
better alternative, the court insisted, was to stick by its bright-line rule: if an
individual does not have a biological or adoptive link to the child, then she
does not have standing to claim parental rights99 unless there are
extraordinary circumstances (in the case of custody)100 or the legal parent is
unfit (in the case of visitation).101
Even though the Court of Appeals in Debra H. once again refused to
adopt the concept of functional parenthood, it nonetheless proceeded to
grant standing to the petitioner on the ground that she had entered into a
Vermont civil union with the legal parent before the child’s birth.102 In the
court’s view, the existence of that union meant that the petitioner would
have standing to seek custody and visitation under Vermont law.103 And
principles of comity, the court held, required it to apply that state’s law.104
In assessing Vermont’s parentage law, the New York court correctly
looked to the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, the leading case in that state on the parental rights of former
partners.105 The New York court, however, misread Miller-Jenkins on one
crucial point: Although the Vermont Supreme Court concluded in MillerJenkins that the parties’ civil union was “an extremely persuasive evidence
of joint parentage,” it did not hold that such a union was dispositive of the
standing question.106 The court did not rule, in other words, that the only
way in which an individual who lacks a biological or adoptive link to a
child can be granted standing to seek parental rights is if he or she had
entered into a legally-recognized relationship with the legal parent. Indeed,
the Vermont court pointed to other factors that supported granting
parentage status to the petitioner in Miller-Jenkins, including the intent and
expectations of both women, the petitioner’s participation in the decision to
have her partner inseminated, and the fact that the biological mother held
her partner out as the child’s parent before the relationship dissolved.107 In
contrast, the New York court turned the civil union, which for the Vermont
court was an important though not essential evidence of parentage status,

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 192-93.
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976).
Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987).
Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 195-96.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
Id. at 971.
Id. at 970. For a more detailed discussion of the background and reasoning of
Miller-Jenkins, see BALL, supra note 56, at 103-11.
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into a necessary element of that status (in the absence of biological or
adoptive links).
It seems to me that the New York court’s misreading of Miller-Jenkins
was the result of its normative prioritization of certainty and predictability
above all other considerations in determining who has standing to raise
parenting claims. It is not surprising that a court which is mostly
concerned with certainty and the “ease of application” of parental standing
rules would deem the existence of a legally-recognized relationship
between the two adults to be determinative of whether a petitioner who
lacks biological or adoptive links with the child should be granted standing
to exercise parental rights.108
Indeed, the weight that the New York court gave to the civil union in
Debra H. was a logical extension of its rejection of Wisconsin’s four-part
standing test.109 As a factual matter, it is much easier to determine whether
two individuals have entered into a civil union than it is to determine
whether a party seeking custody and visitation successfully established a
parent-like relationship with the child. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the Debra H. court, in explaining why the civil union “support[ed] the nonbiological partner’s parentage,” emphasized that its existence meant that
there was “no potential for misunderstanding, ignorance or deceit.”110
As we will see in Part V, there is a heavy price to pay for the “ease of
application” gains that come with requiring, before recognizing parentage
status, that the individual in question either (1) established biological or
adoptive links with the child or (2) entered into a legally-recognized
relationship with the legal parent. This is because the application of either
bright-line rule in former partner cases denies children second parents,
effectively rendering them illegitimate.111
An overarching concern with certainty and predictability was not only
evident in the Debra H. majority opinion; it also played a crucial role in
108. Other courts have specifically rejected the notion that a former partner’s
parentage status should be determined by the legal nature of her relationship with the
legal parent. The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, refused to accept the legal
parent’s argument that the state’s failure to recognize same-sex marriages or domestic
partnerships was relevant to the determination of whether her former partner was
entitled to seek visitation. Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67, 2011 WL 553923 (Feb. 17,
2011). In doing so, the court made clear that the focus should not be on the nature of
the relationship between the two adults, but “on what, if any, bond has formed between
the child and the nonparent.” Id. at *11; see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 918
(Pa. 2001) (noting that “the nature of the relationship between Appellant and Appellee
has no legal significance to the determination of whether Appellee stands in loco
parentis to” the child).
109. See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
110. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195 (N.Y. 2010). The court noted that
this was especially true when the union was entered into (as it was in Debra H.) before
the child was born. Id.
111. See infra Part V.
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two of the three concurring opinions. In fact, it would seem that the main
reason why Judge Victoria Graffeo wrote a concurring opinion was to
emphasize the point that “[f]or 19 years the rule articulated in Alison D. has
provided certainty and predictability to New York parents and their
children.”112 Judge Graffeo added that
[u]nder Alison D., when a romantic relationship ends, whether the parties
were same-sex or heterosexual partners, a hearing to determine who is
the child’s legal parent is generally unnecessary as the parentage issue
can readily be determined as a matter of law based on objective genetic
proof or documentary evidence. Thus, protracted litigation on the
standing of a party hoping to obtain custodial rights or visitation is
avoided, which further promotes the settlement of these issues rather
than the contentious litigation that is all too frequently harmful to
children.113

Even Judge Robert Smith, whose concurring opinion called for the
overruling of Alison D., used certainty as his normative polestar in
explaining what should have been the correct approach in Debra H. After
claiming that “[t]here are few areas of the law where certainty is more
important than in the rules governing who a child’s parents are[,]”114 Judge
Smith proceeded to agree with the majority that the type of multi-part test
endorsed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was unworkable because its
“vague formulas [are] a recipe for endless litigation, which would mean
endless misery for children and adults alike.”115
Instead of following the Wisconsin court’s lead, Judge Smith would have
adopted “a different ‘bright-line rule’” than that called for by Alison D.116
Smith would have held “that where a child is conceived through
[alternative insemination] by one member of a same-sex couple living
together, with the knowledge and consent of the other, the child is as a
matter of law—at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances—the
child of both.”117
Judge Smith deserves credit for his willingness to overrule Alison D.118
112. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 197-98 (Graffeo, J., concurring); see also id. at 198
(reasoning that the Alison D. “rule has avoided confusion, particularly in the event a
relationship is dissolved years later, as to whether the party lacking biological or legal
ties to the child (i.e., who failed to pursue an adoption) would have standing to petition
for custody or visitation”).
113. Id. at 198-99; see also id. at 199 (“[T]he criteria for establishing parental rights
should be objective to ensure certainty for the parties and consistency in application.”).
114. Id. at 204 (Smith, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 205. I will later explore the merits of Judge Smith’s proposed rule. See
infra Part IV.
118. Id. at 204 (explaining that although “the interest in certainty is extremely strong
in this area[,] . . . society’s interest in assuring, to the extent possible, that each child
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Indeed, it was Smith, as we will see in Part V, who recognized that the
court’s upholding of Alison D. essentially rendered an entire class of
children illegitimate.119 But for now, I want to emphasize that Smith’s
opinion agreed with the majority and with Judge Graffeo’s concurring
opinion on two crucial points: first, that Alison D. created a great deal of
certainty and predictability in the law of parenthood in New York and,
second, that the type of multi-factor test adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is so vague and amorphous that it inevitably leads to
uncertainty and unpredictability in answering the question of who has
standing to sue for custody and visitation. I take issue with both of these
claims in the next part of the Article.
III. THE CONTRASTING CERTAINTIES IN THE APPLICATION OF STANDING
RULES IN NEW YORK AND WISCONSIN PARENTING CASES
It would be reasonable to believe, given the Debra H. court’s claims
regarding the high degree of certainty in parenting cases that followed
Alison D., that New York courts in the last two decades have had little
difficulty determining who has standing to seek custody and visitation.
The story, however, is considerably more complicated than that. Alison D.
engendered a great deal of uncertainty among lower New York courts
because its rigid formula seemed so inconsistent with children’s best
interests.120 In addition, the New York Court of Appeals created a great
deal of confusion when it rejected the doctrine of functional parenthood
while at the same time embracing the application of equitable estoppel
principles in parenting cases.121
In contrast, Wisconsin courts seem to have had little difficulty applying
their state’s multi-part functional parenthood test.122 This should lead us to
question the claim made by the Debra H. majority (and by the authors of
two concurring opinions in that case) that functional parenthood tests are
unworkable, unpredictable, and ultimately harmful to children.123
A. Uncertainties in New York Parenting Law
It cannot be disputed that, on its face, the rule emanating from Alison D.
begins life with two parents is not less so.”). Judge Carmen Ciparick also wrote a
separate concurrence in which she explained that she would have overruled Alison D.
and replaced it with a multi-factor test like the one embraced by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Id. at 202 (Ciparick, J., concurring).
119. See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
122. That test is set forth in supra note 96 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 86-101, 112-19 and accompanying text.
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is easy to apply and that, if applied consistently, it would lead to certainty
and predictability in the case law. The Alison D. court, after all, held that
only individuals who enjoy a biological or adoptive link to a child may be
considered “parents” for standing purposes.124 The actual application of
that rule, however, has not been so straightforward, in part because, as one
of the concurring judges in Debra H. put it, its harshness has led some
judges to “engage in deft legal maneuvering to explain away [its] apparent
applicability . . . .”125
A critical crack in Alison D.’s veneer became apparent in 1998 when an
intermediate appellate court refused to follow its holding in a case called
Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H.126 When the female plaintiff in that case started
dating the male defendant in 1987, she was already pregnant with another
man’s child.127 Two years after the child was born, the couple married and
later had a child together.128 Several years later, the woman filed for
divorce.129 She also sought a judicial ruling that her husband was not her
first child’s father.130 The husband then countered by filing an action for
custody and visitation without alleging that the mother was unfit.131
The trial court in Jean Maby H. reasoned that the husband was
categorically precluded from seeking either custody or visitation because
the New York Court of Appeals had held (1) in Bennett that a person who
is not a biological parent cannot seek custody unless there are extraordinary
circumstances;132 (2) in Ronald FF. that the extraordinary circumstances
exception was unavailable in visitation cases;133 and (3) in Alison D. that
someone who lacked a biological or adoptive link to the child could not be
deemed a “parent.”134
The intermediate appellate court, however, concluded that these New
York Court of Appeals precedents should not be “blindly applied” because
doing so would be inconsistent with the best interests of children in some

124. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the
petitioner has “no right to petition the court to displace the choice made by this fit
parent in deciding what is in the child’s best interests”).
125. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 201 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J.,
concurring).
126. Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1999).
127. Id. at 678.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. The trial court’s ruling is
summarized in Jean Maby H., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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instances.135 Instead of turning to the bright-line rules announced in cases
such as Ronald FF. and Alison D., the court relied on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to conclude that the wife should be prevented from
questioning the husband’s parentage status after she allowed him to
function as the child’s parent for many years.136 In particular, the court
noted that the defendant had been named as the father in the child’s birth
certificate, and that “he was held out as [the child’s] father to others for
over seven years, during which time he established a strong father-daughter
relationship, and he supported [the child] financially throughout the
marriage.”137
In order to understand the outcome in Jean Maby H., we need to know
that the New York Court of Appeals, at around the same time that it
adopted the Alison D. bright-line rule, endorsed the use of equitable
estoppel doctrine to prevent women from denying the paternity of men who
had established functional parent-child relationships with their children.
The court, in the 1984 case of Sharon GG. v. Duane HH., summarily
affirmed an intermediate appellate court ruling holding that a wife was
estopped from questioning her husband’s paternity despite the fact that a
blood test showed that her boyfriend (and not her husband) was in all
likelihood the child’s biological father.138 The wife in Sharon GG., who
wanted to deny the husband the ability to visit with the child, was not
permitted to question his paternity because “throughout the period of the
135. Jean Maby H., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 682; see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 797
N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (App. Div. 2005) (Sweeny, J., concurring) (noting that the New
York Court of Appeals in Alison D. “defined a rigid construct which concomitantly
ignores the reality of the relationships that nurture and develop a child”).
136. Jean Maby H., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
137. Id; see also Christopher S. v. Ann Marie S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (Fam. Ct.
1997) (noting that neither Alison D. v. Virginia M. nor Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG.
“squarely addressed the issue of equitable estoppel”). Although equitable estoppel was
initially applied in paternity cases, some New York courts, as Jean Maby H. shows,
eventually also applied the doctrine in custody and visitation ones. As a New York
court explained:
No logical reason [exists] for allowing the doctrine of equitable estoppel to be
used to advance the best interests of the child in a paternity case and to
disallow application of that doctrine in the context of a custody [or visitation]
case, not involving issues of paternity . . . [since] the fundamental rights sought
to be protected and the reasons advanced for protecting those rights are
identical—the best interests of the child.
Christopher S., 662 N.Y.S.2d at 203; see also Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238,
244 (App. Div. 2001) (Peters, J., concurring) (“[I]f a biological mother can assert the
parental bond between a nonbiological or nonadoptive father and her child as a shield
against prosecution of a paternity proceeding by a putative biological father, such
nonbiological or nonadoptive father should have the ability to use the parental bond as
a sword to establish standing in a visitation proceeding to ensure that the best interest
of a child is secured.”).
138. Sharon GG. v. Duane HH., 467 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942-43 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d,
472 N.E.2d 46 (N.Y. 1984).
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marriage, she held the child out as her husband’s son, designating him as
the father in the birth certificate and baptismal rites; . . . she accepted
support for the child while they lived together and after they separated;
and . . . she permitted a strong parent-child bond to be formed between the
husband and the child.”139
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is grounded in considerations of
fairness, preventing parties from asserting otherwise cognizable rights after
they allow others to reasonably rely on assurances that they will refrain
from doing so. As the New York Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right
after having led another to form the reasonable belief that the right would
not be asserted, and loss or prejudice to the other would result if the right
were asserted.”140 Another New York appellate court has elaborated on
this point by explaining that
[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may successfully be invoked, in the
interest of fairness, to prevent the enforcement of rights which would
ultimately work fraud or injustice upon the person against whom
enforcement is sought . . . . An estoppel defense may also be invoked
where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to
circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of the right
after a lapse of time. Similarly, an equitable estoppel may be imposed to
prevent injustice suffered by a person who, in justifiable reliance upon
the words or conduct of another, is induced to act or forbear.141

It may seem at first glance that the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
concerned as it is with questions of fairness and reliance, is distinct in
important ways from that of functional parenthood, which focuses inter alia
on the issue of whether the individual in question served as a parent for a
sufficiently lengthy period of time. Yet, the distinction between the two
doctrines, as I discuss in more detail below, is not so stark because whether
equitable estoppel principles apply in parenting cases frequently depends
on factors that are similar to those relevant in determining whether
functional parenthood principles are applicable.142 As a result, if it is
139. Sharon GG., 467 N.Y.S.2d at 943. The applicability of equitable estoppel
principles meant that the wife could not challenge the husband’s paternity unless she
presented evidence as to why doing so would be in the child’s best interests. Id. at 944
(“Once the husband had claimed paternity and had made the requisite showing of
operative facts to support an estoppel, it was incumbent upon the wife to show why an
estoppel should not be applied in the best interests of the child.”) (citation omitted). It
is important to note that the New York Court of Appeals has not limited the application
of the equitable estoppel doctrine to parenting cases in which the non-legal parent was
married to the legal one. See Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006). I
discuss Shondel J. in infra notes 143-156 and accompanying text.
140. Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 613.
141. Charles v. Charles, 745 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).
142. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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possible, without much difficulty, to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to prevent a legal parent from denying the parentage status of
another person who has functioned as a parent, then it would also seem
possible, without much difficulty, to apply the doctrine of functional
parenthood to determine whether someone should be granted the
opportunity to seek custody and visitation over a legal parent’s objections.
There is, then, significant tension between the New York Court of
Appeals’ embrace of equitable estoppel in Sharon GG. and its forceful
rejection of functional parenthood in Alison D. That tension, and the
confusion it created, was exacerbated in 2006 when the same court, in
Shondel J. v. Mark D., strongly reaffirmed the appropriateness of applying
equitable estoppel principles in parenting cases.143
The year after Shondel and Mark started dating, the former gave birth to
a baby girl in Guyana.144 For several years after that, Mark supported the
child financially and visited with her frequently when Shondel brought her
to New York.145 Mark also “signed a Guyana registry, stating that he was
her father and authorizing the change of her last name to his[, and] named
the child the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy, identifying
her as his daughter.”146
Eventually, Mark stopped financially supporting the child, leading
Shondel to bring a paternity and support action in New York family court.
At first, Mark not only refused to contest his paternity, but he also sought
the right to visit with the child.147 Later in the proceedings, however, he
asked that a DNA test be conducted, the result of which indicated he was
not the child’s biological father.148 Despite the test result, the family court
concluded that Mark should be estopped from disclaiming his paternity
because he had “held himself out as [the] child’s father, and behaved in
every way as if he was the father, albeit a father who didn’t reside for a
good part of the child’s life, in the same country.”149 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, agreeing with the lower court’s determination that it was proper
to apply equitable estoppel principles in order to assign Mark parentage
status.150
Notice the similarities between the circumstances of cases such as
Shondel J. and those of ones like Alison D. In both instances, the crux of
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 614-15.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612-14.
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the legal dispute is whether someone who does not have a biological or
adoptive connection to a child should be granted (or required to accept)
parentage status. Yet, while the Court of Appeals applied a categorical rule
in Alison D., concluding that a so-called “third party” should never be
granted parentage status under functional parenthood principles,151 it ruled
in Shondel J. that such a party may be granted parentage status on equitable
estoppel grounds.152
It bears noting that in the same way that there is no bright-line rule
establishing when a non-legal parent has sufficiently acted as a parent with
the consent of the legal parent so as to make it appropriate to invoke the
doctrine of functional parenthood, there is also no bright-line rule
establishing when equitable estoppel principles require that someone who
has acted as a parent and established a relationship with a child should be
estopped from denying his parentage status. Indeed, the facts that New
York courts look to in equitable estoppel cases are similar to those that
courts in other jurisdictions consider when applying the functional
parenthood doctrine.153
This similarity is evident from the facts
emphasized by the New York Court of Appeals in Shondel J. to support its
conclusion that equitable estoppel principles prevented Mark from denying
his parentage status. The court noted that
Mark held himself out as the child’s father, and behaved in every way as
if he was the father. Mark and the child had a close relationship, in
which he referred to himself as her “daddy,” and which involved regular
telephone conversations, frequent visits when she and Mark were in the
same city, and contact with his parents. Moreover, Mark named the
child as the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy and sent
money monthly for the child’s support until June 1999 and then less
regularly through the summer of 2000 . . . . The record also establishes
that the child justifiably relied on Mark’s representations, accepting and
treating him as her father. 154
151. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
152. Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 614-15.
153. See Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (App. Div. 2001) (Peters, J.,

concurring). Summarizing New York law on the matter, Judge Peters explained that:
[t]o effectively establish standing [under equitable estoppel principles, a]
nonbiological or nonadoptive parent . . . must show, inter alia, that the actions
or encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent caused the creation of
the parental bond between the petitioner and the child in the first instance; that
he or she has assumed “the full panoply of parental obligations . . . [; and] that
the child is [now] actually psychologically bonded or dependent upon that
person as a ‘parent.’”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
154. Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 614. As we have seen, the question of whether the
legal parent consented to and fostered the relationship between the child and the socalled third party is a crucial aspect of the functional parent analysis. See supra notes
62-65 and accompanying text. Similarly, the question of whether the legal parent
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Notice that the facts found relevant by the New York Court of Appeals
in applying the equitable estoppel doctrine are similar to those that are
relevant under the Wisconsin multi-part functional parenthood test. That
test asks inter alia whether the individual had ongoing contact, and
successfully established a parental relationship, with the child.155 It is
illogical for New York’s highest court to have concluded in Debra H. that
the factual determination called for by the functional parenthood doctrine is
cumbersome and unpredictable, while essentially looking to the same
factors to determine the applicability of the equitable estoppel doctrine in
Shondel J.156
It also bears emphasizing that children in both kinds of cases are likely to
have enjoyed ongoing parent-child relationships with the so-called “third
parties,” meaning that they are likely to be harmed in similar ways if those
relationships are permanently disrupted. It is therefore also inconsistent for
the Court of Appeals to have been (appropriately) concerned about the
negative impact on children of being denied continued access (and support
from) non-legal parents in the equitable estoppel context while ignoring
that same impact in functional parenthood ones.157
Although the court in Alison D. recognized that the petitioner in that case
had “nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child,”158 it did not
consented to and fostered the relationship between the child and the so-called third
party can be a crucial aspect of the equitable estoppel analysis. Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d
at 613 (noting that in an earlier equitable estoppel case, the court had found it relevant
that the legal parent “had held the child out as her husband’s, accepted his support for
the child while she and her husband lived together and after they separated, and
permitted her husband and child to form strong ties”) (discussing Matter of Sharon GG.
v. Duane HH., 467 N.Y.S.2d 941 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d 472 N.E.2d 46 (N.Y. 1984)).
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
156. The Court of Appeals in Debra H. tried to explain away the seemingly clear
tension between Alison D. and Shondel J. by noting that the legislature had enacted a
statute specifically authorizing the use of equitable estoppel in paternity cases. As the
court put it:
We see no inconsistency in applying equitable estoppel to determine filiation
for purposes of support, but not to create standing when visitation and custody
are sought. [T]he Legislature has drawn the distinction for us: sections 418(a)
and 532(a) of the Family Court Act [which address questions of paternity]
direct the courts to take equitable estoppel into account before ordering
paternity testing, while section 70 of the Domestic Relations Law [which
allows a “parent” to seek custody and visitation] does not even mention
equitable estoppel.
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 191 (N.Y. 2010). Note, however, that even if
we assume arguendo that it was appropriate for the court to limit its equitable powers
in custody and visitation cases because of the absence of legislative guidance on the
subject, that contention does not undermine the point that I am making here, namely,
that the application of equitable estoppel principles brings with it a similar degree of
certainty as does the application of functional parenthood principles.
157. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
158. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).
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consider legally relevant the effect on the child of not being able to
continue enjoying a parent-child relationship with a woman who had
helped care for him during the first two years of his life.159 In stark
contrast, the same court stated in Shondel J. that “[t]he potential damage to
a child’s psyche caused by suddenly ending established parental support
need only be stated to be appreciated. Cutting off that support, whether
emotional or financial, may leave the child in a worse position than if that
support had never been given.”160 The court’s recognition that children are
harmed when they are cut off from those whom they have come to depend
on as parents in Shondel J. only makes more perplexing its unwillingness to
take into account the same harm to children in cases like Alison D. and
Debra H.
It should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals has also held, in
Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N., that “the doctrine of equitable estoppel may
be used by a purported biological father to prevent a child’s mother from
asserting [his] biological paternity—when the mother has acquiesced in the
development of a close relationship between the child and another father
figure, and it would be detrimental to the child’s interests to disrupt that
relationship.”161 As the court put it, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
works to “protect[] the status interests of a child in an already recognized
and operative parent-child relationship.”162 As in Shondel J., but unlike in
Alison D., the court in Juanita A. focused on the nature of the relationship
between the non-biological parent and the child, as well as on the impact
that a disruption in that relationship would have on the child’s wellbeing.163
The unwillingness of some lower courts to apply Alison D. in ways that
were clearly inconsistent with the best interests of children,164 when
coupled with the Court of Appeals’ embrace of equitable estoppel
principles in parenting cases,165 created a great deal of confusion and made
it difficult to predict how lower courts would rule. In 2008, for example, a
trial judge relied on equitable estoppel principles to reject a biological
mother’s attempt to use Alison D. to deny parentage status to her former

159. See id. (noting that despite the apparently close relationship between the
petitioner and the child, the former was nonetheless “not a parent within the meaning of
Domestic Relations Law § 70”).
160. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 615-16 (N.Y. 2006).
161. Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N., 930 N.E.2d 214, 216-17 (N.Y. 2010).
162. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
163. See id. at 216-17. Ironically, the court issued its ruling in Juanita A. on the
same day that it strongly reaffirmed Alison D. in Debra H.
164. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
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partner.166 That court, pointing to both Shondel J. and Jean Maby H. (the
earlier intermediate appellate court ruling that relied on equitable estoppel
principles to grant standing in a visitation case to a non-legal parent),167
granted visitation standing to the biological mother’s former female
partner.168 As the court explained, “if the concern of both the legislature
and the Court of Appeals is what is in the child’s best interest, a formulaic
approach to finding that a ‘parent’ can only mean a biologic or adoptive
parent may not always be appropriate.”169
The confusing, and unequal, application of parenting law in New York
following Alison D. is perhaps most clear when we compare two cases
decided about a year apart by two panels of the same intermediate appellate
court department. In the first case, involving a dissolved lesbian
relationship, the court held that the legal parent’s former partner was
categorically precluded from seeking custody and visitation.170 In that
case, the same-sex couple, after living together for seventeen years, decided
to have a child, with one partner becoming pregnant through alternative
insemination.171 After the child was born, the petitioner “participated in
rearing the child and contributed to her financial support.”172 When the
child was three and a half years old, the couple jointly filed adoption papers
seeking to have the petitioner adopt the child, but the adoption was not
finalized because the couple separated a few months later.173 The appellate
court ruled that the petitioner lacked standing to seek custody and visitation
unless she could show the existence of extraordinary circumstances.174 The
court further explained that those circumstances did not exist simply
because “the child has bonded psychologically with the nonparent.”175
But less than a year later, the same court held that a man who was not the
biological father of a child born to his wife during their marriage was
entitled to show that he should be granted standing to seek custody of the
child under the extraordinary circumstances exception.176 The court did not
base its ruling on the fact that the couple was married at the time the child

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 508-09.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (App. Div. 1998).
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Gilbert A. v. Laura A., 689 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1999).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

27

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 10

650

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

was born.177 Instead, after ruling (as it had in the case discussed in the
previous paragraph involving the lesbian couple) that the formation of a
parent-child bond is not enough to support a finding of extraordinary
circumstances,178 it proceeded to hold that the legal parent’s consent to and
fostering of the relationship between the non-biological parent and the
child did constitute an extraordinary circumstance.179 The court then
remanded the case for a hearing on the husband’s custody petition.180
It simply makes no sense for the court to have given the party claiming
to be the non-legal parent in the second case the opportunity to establish
standing based on the fact that the legal parent consented to and fostered
his relationship with the child, while denying that opportunity to the
petitioner in the first case. Indeed, it would seem that that petitioner would
have had little difficulty showing that the legal parent, with whom she had
shared a home for almost two decades, consented to and fostered her
relationship with the child.181
As these and other cases illustrate, there was great inconsistency in New
York parenting case law following Alison D., with some lower courts
rejecting efforts by biological parents to rely on that case to deny standing
to their former partners,182 while others reached the opposite conclusion by
ruling that Alison D. categorically prevented former partners who lacked a
biological or adoptive link to the child from gaining standing regardless of
the nature or extent of their relationship with that child.183
177. In remanding the case, the court did point out “that there is a Supreme Court
judgment adjudging that [the boy] is a child of the marriage.” Id. at 811. The court,
however, did not take that fact into account in its legal reasoning.
178. Id.
179. See id. (“[A] mother’s direct involvement in the creation and development of a
father-son relationship . . . which puts the child in a situation where his welfare could
be affected drastically, can be an extraordinary circumstance.”) (citation omitted).
180. Id.
181. Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (App. Div. 1998).
182. See, e.g., Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (App. Div. 2001) (Peters,
J., concurring) (“If in custody and visitation disputes, common sense, reason and an
overriding concern for the welfare of a child are to prevail over narrow selfish
proclamations of biological primacy, the assertion of equitable estoppel by a nonbiological or nonadoptive parent must be given credence by the courts.”); K.B. v. J.R.,
887 N.Y.S.2d 515, 528 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that female to male transsexual who
helped raise child with legal mother’s consent and encouragement had standing to seek
custody under the extraordinary circumstances doctrine); Ms. H. v. Ms. L., 843
N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Fam. Ct. 2007) (holding that the biological mother’s female
partner, who lived with the child for eight months and helped care for him with consent
of biological mother, had standing to seek custody under the extraordinary
circumstances doctrine); see also judicial rulings discussed in supra notes 126-37, 17680 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (App. Div. 2006);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 797 N.Y.S.2d 754, 754 (App. Div. 2005); Janis C. v.
Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002); Speed v. Robins, 732 N.Y.S.2d
902, 902 (App. Div. 2001); Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239-40 (App. Div.
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It is clear, then, that by the time the Court of Appeals agreed to hear
Debra H., there was much disagreement among lower New York courts
over who qualified for standing in parenting cases.184 This state of affairs
belied the confident assertion made by the Debra H. court that there was
much certainty and predictability in New York parenting law following
Alison D.185
At the same time, as we will see in the next Section, there seems to have
been little confusion in Wisconsin on the question of who qualifies for
parentage status under the doctrine of functional parenthood. This contrast
in certainty is, of course, ironic since the New York Court of Appeals in
Debra H. explicitly rejected the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s approach to
the standing issue because of the supposed confusion and unpredictability
engendered by functional parenthood tests.186
B. Not Exactly Chaos: Functional Parenthood in Wisconsin
In discussing the type of standing rule adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals in Debra H. questioned
both its advisability and its ease of application. The majority opinion
referred to multi-part functional parenthood tests like Wisconsin’s as
“complicated and nonobjective,”187 inevitably leading to “disruptive . . .
battle[s]”188 and “further potential combat”189 between the parties. The
New York court added that the tests are “inherently unpredictable,”190
encouraging “contentious, costly, and lengthy”191 litigation that “threatens
to trap single biological and adoptive parents and their children in a limbo
of doubt.”192 For her part, one of the concurring judges in Debra H.
2001); C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
184. The certainty that the court sought to promote in Debra H. seems to have been
undermined by another ruling it issued on the same day. See H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d
206 (N.Y. 2010). In H.M., the court held that the family court had jurisdiction to hear a
child support claim brought by a biological mother against her former female partner
who did not have a biological or adoptive link to the child. Id. at 208-09. Although the
issue on appeal was a jurisdictional one, that is, whether the family court in particular
could hear the case, the Court of Appeals, by allowing the child support claim to
proceed, showed a willingness to afford parentage status—at least for purposes of child
support—in the absence of a biological or adoptive relationship between the adult and
the child. See id. at 214 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“[T]he position taken by the majority
here is inconsistent with this Court’s holding today in Debra H., which reaffirmed that
Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., is still good law.”) (internal citations omitted).
185. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 192-93 (N.Y. 2010).
186. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
187. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 192.
188. Id. at 191.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 193 n.4.
191. Id. at 192.
192. Id. at 193.
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claimed that such tests lead to “contentious litigation that is all too
frequently harmful to children,”193 while another concurring judge
contended that they are unworkable because their “vague formulas [are] a
recipe for endless litigation, which . . . mean[s] endless misery for children
and adults alike.”194
In making these claims, none of the judges cited any cases or findings
from Wisconsin (or from the other jurisdictions that have adopted similar
functional parenthood tests). This is not surprising since there is little
evidence that the application of the functional parenthood test in Wisconsin
has led to the type of uncertainty and unpredictability that so concerned
New York’s highest court.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first faced the standing question in a
former partner parenting case in In re Interest of Z.J.H.195 The relevant
facts in that 1991 case were not in dispute—the legal parent, who had
adopted the child, conceded that her former partner had developed a
“‘parent-like’ relationship” with the child.196 The legal parent, however,
insisted that despite that relationship, her former partner should be denied
standing as a matter of law, a position accepted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.197 To grant the former partner the opportunity to seek parental rights
under the state’s in loco parentis doctrine, the high court concluded, would
be inconsistent with “this state’s adherence to the ‘parental preference’
standard . . . in the resolution of custody disputes.
The ‘parental
preference’ rule gives great deference to the rights of [legal] parents . . . to
raise their children.198 While this rule recognizes the rights of children, it
also assumes that normally it is in the best interests of the child to be raised
by his or her parent.”199 The court also worried that the application of the
in loco parentis doctrine in former partner cases “would open the doors to
multiple parties claiming custody of children[,]” leading to the possibility
that “a child could have multiple ‘parents,’ and could find himself or
herself subject to multiple custody and visitation arrangements.”200
Only four years later, however, the state supreme court changed its mind,
ruling in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. that Wisconsin courts did, after all,
have the equitable power to grant visitation standing to a non-legal parent
193. Id. at 199 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 204 (Smith, J., concurring).
195. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), overruled by Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody

of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
196. In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 206.
197. Id. at 204.
198. Id. at 207.
199. See id. (“To the extent that we award custody rights to one who stands in loco
parentis, we diminish the rights of legal parents . . . .”) (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 208.
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who had established a parent-like relationship with the child with the legal
parent’s consent and encouragement.201 The court this time around rejected
the notion that legal parents “have absolute rights in their children,”202
while adding that “[t]he state’s public policy, established by the legislature,
directs the court to respect and protect parental autonomy and at the same
time to serve the best interest of the child.”203
The H.S.H.-K. court reasoned that parental autonomy and the granting of
standing to former partners through the doctrine of in loco parentis were
not inconsistent because that doctrine could be applied only if there was
evidence that the legal parent consented to and fostered the relationship
between the petitioner and the child.204 At the same time, the court
recognized that the doctrine helped “protect[] a child’s best interest by
preserving the child’s relationship with an adult who has been like a
parent.”205
The Wisconsin court held that a petitioner should be given the
opportunity to show that granting her visitation rights would be in the
child’s best interests if she satisfied a four-part test.206 This test, as we have
seen, requires a petitioner to show that the legal parent consented to and
fostered her relationship with the child; that she and the child lived in the
same household; that she assumed the traditional responsibilities of
parenthood; and that she established a parental bond with the child.207
If the New York Court of Appeals had been correct in its assessment that
functional parenthood tests such as the one adopted by the Wisconsin court
are unworkable and unpredictable,208 one would expect to find a great deal
of litigation in Wisconsin following H.S.H.-K. as courts there struggle with
—what the New York court claimed to be—its vague and amorphous
multi-part functional parenthood test. But a study of Wisconsin appellate
opinions shows that there has been very little appellate litigation since 1995
involving the application of that test. Indeed, I have been unable to find a
single post-H.S.H.-K. appellate ruling in Wisconsin raising the issue of
whether the four-part test was properly applied or whether any given
individual qualified (or not) for standing under that standard.
There has been appellate litigation in Wisconsin involving the question
201.
1995).
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis.
Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
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of which types of cases merit the application of the H.S.H.-K. multi-part
test.209 A Wisconsin appellate court, for example, has held that H.S.H.-K.
does not apply when a legal parent requests that a guardian be appointed,
that guardianship is later terminated, and the guardian then seeks
visitation.210 Another Wisconsin appellate court has held that H.S.H.-K.
does not provide original grandparents with the opportunity to seek
visitation after the legal parents’ rights have been terminated and the
children are adopted by new parents.211 But the issue in these cases was
whether the H.S.H.-K. test applied; it did not involve disputes over how the
H.S.H.-K. test should be applied. There appear to have been no reported
Wisconsin appellate opinions on the latter question in the seventeen years
since H.S.H.-K. was decided. This lack of case law suggests that the multipart test adopted in that case—despite the New York Court of Appeals’
claim to the contrary—has not led to protracted litigation on the question of
who has standing to claim parental rights.212
It is also instructive to look at parenting litigation in New Jersey because
that state’s supreme court in 2000 explicitly adopted the four-part test
formulated by the Wisconsin court in H.S.H.-K.213 A review of New Jersey
appellate opinions since then suggests that New Jersey courts have not
experienced undue difficulty in determining whether a particular petitioner
satisfies the functional parent criteria.214
In one case, for example, the court held that a great aunt, who cared for
the child temporarily, did not qualify as a psychological parent because the
child’s grandmother, who had legal custody, never intended for the aunt to
serve as a parent.215 In another case, the court held that the psychological
parenting test was “clearly met” in a case in which the legal parent
consented to and fostered the relationship between the petitioner and the
child, and in which the petitioner “acted as a father to [the child] in every
way—caring for and teaching him as a father would.”216 In a third case, a
209. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Jenae K.S., 539 N.W.2d 104 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995).
210. See id. at 107-08.
211. In re Custody and Visitation of Jeffery A.W., 539 N.W.2d 195 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995).
212. Shortly after H.S.H.-K. was decided, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded
two cases for additional fact-finding in light of that decision. See Waite v. Wemmer,
554 N.W.2d 684 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished decision); In re Paternity of
Marian G.F.–McG. et al. v. Raymond G.F., 546 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(unpublished decision).
213. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000).
214. See, e.g., J.W. v. R.J.R., 2010 WL 520505 (N.J. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2010)
(unpublished decision).
215. Id. at *1.
216. Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319, 328 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2000).
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biological father’s former girlfriend was deemed the children’s
psychological parent, a factual finding the father did not contest.217
In one New Jersey case in which the extent of the petitioner’s
involvement in the child’s life was disputed, the appellate court concluded
that the trial court had properly granted summary judgment on behalf of the
legal parent without holding a plenary hearing.218 This ruling is important
because it belies the suggestion made by the Debra H. court that every case
in which a party alleges that she qualifies as a functional parent requires the
holding of an extensive and protracted hearing.219 As the New Jersey court
explained, a hearing is not required when the petitioner’s alleged facts,
even if taken as true, would be insufficient to satisfy the functional
parenthood test.220
217. See Hatkins v. Hernandez, 2010 WL 1926550 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. May 5,
2010) (unpublished decision); see also Vogel v. Balkus, 2006 WL 1512010 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. June 2, 2006) (unpublished decision) (suggesting that trial court may
have failed to give petitioner sufficient opportunity to establish that he was a
psychological parent, but holding that such a failure was not reversible error because
petitioner, who was a convicted child molester, would not have been able to establish
that granting him visitation would be in the child’s best interest).
Courts in other jurisdictions also seem to have run into few difficulties applying
functional parenthood principles. For example, following the Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s recognition of de facto parenthood in a former same-sex partner parenting case,
see Rubano v. DiCenzo, 795 A.2d 959, 967 (R.I. 2000), there seems to have been only
two reported appellate cases in that state involving whether a particular individual
qualified for the status of de facto parent. In one of them, the state supreme court had
no difficulty concluding that there was enough evidence in the record to support the
trial court’s determination that the petitioner, who was incarcerated while his wife
adopted the child in question, did not meet the de facto parent standard because he had
never lived with the child and his contact with him was “intermittent and quite
insignificant.” de Bont v. de Bont, 826 A.2d 968, 970 (R.I. 2003). Similarly, in the
second case, the state supreme court easily concluded that a petitioner who had never
lived with the legal parent and the child, and who did not introduce evidence that the
legal parent fostered a parental relationship between the petitioner and the child, did not
have standing to seek visitation. Keenan v. Somberg, 792 A.2d 47, 49 (R.I. 2002).
218. A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
219. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 192 (N.Y. 2010) (footnote omitted).
The court criticized the petitioner for
Ask[ing] us to replace the bright-line rule in Alison D. with a complicated and
nonobjective test for determining so-called functional or de facto parentage at
an equitable-estoppel hearing to be conducted by the trial court after discovery
and fact-intensive inquiry in the individual case. These equitable-estoppel
hearings—which would be followed by a second, best-interest hearing in the
event functional or de facto parentage is demonstrated to the trial court’s
satisfaction—are likely often to be contentious, costly, and lengthy.
Id.
220. See A.F., 771 A.2d at 698 (“Once it became clear that plaintiff could not meet
any one of the first three prongs [of the functional parenthood test], the relationship
between plaintiff and the child became legally irrelevant. It was therefore appropriate
to deny plaintiff’s application for appointment of an expert to perform a bonding
evaluation and to dismiss the complaint without a plenary hearing.”) (footnote
omitted); see also R.B. v. A.P., 2007 WL 1388187 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. May 14,
2007) (unpublished decision) (holding that since the petitioner did not establish that she

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

33

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 10

656

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

If multi-part functional parenthood tests like the one adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (and later embraced by the New Jersey Supreme
Court) had led to the kind of protracted litigation feared by the New York
Court of Appeals in Debra H., one would expect to find evidence of that in
appellate opinions. However, that is not the case—far from instilling
confusion and years of court proceedings, the Wisconsin (and New Jersey)
courts seem to have had little difficulty in applying the test. If anything,
there appears to have been significantly more uncertainty during the last
two decades over who qualifies for parenthood status in New York than in
Wisconsin.221 This suggests that the New York Court of Appeals was
wrong in defending its approach to parenthood cases as one that promotes
certainty and predictability while criticizing that of jurisdictions like
Wisconsin for doing the opposite.
IV. INTENT VS. FUNCTION IN PARENTING DETERMINATIONS
There is one additional aspect of Debra H. that is worth mentioning
given our interest here in the intersection of parenthood and certainty. In
his concurring opinion, Judge Robert Smith, after rejecting functional
parenthood tests as unworkable and harmful to children,222 called for the
application of what he categorized as “a bright-line rule.”223 According to
Judge Smith, when “a child is conceived through [alternative insemination]
by one member of a same-sex couple living together, with the knowledge
and consent of the other, the child [should be] as a matter of law—at least
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances—the child of both.”224
had ever lived with the child, it was not necessary for the trial court to have appointed
an expert to determine whether petitioner and child developed a parent-child bond).
Sometimes, of course, a hearing has to be held on whether a particular petitioner
satisfies the functional parenthood doctrine. In P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780 (N.J. App.
Div. 2004), for example, the mother of two children had her parental rights terminated,
with custody eventually given to the child’s maternal aunt. Id. at 782. After the aunt—
who had two children of her own—had a difficult time coping with two additional
children, she asked a friend and downstairs neighbor to help. Id. The extent to which
the neighbor, for the following four years, cared for the child who was the subject of
the dispute was hotly contested by the parties. The appellate court eventually affirmed
the lower court’s conclusion that the neighbor had satisfied the four-part functional
parenthood test. Id. at 791-92.
221. Compare supra notes 121-81 and accompanying text (discussing New York
parentage cases following Alison D.), with supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text
(discussing Wisconsin parentage cases following H.S.H.-K.).
222. See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 204 (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that
functional parenthood doctrine’s “vague formulas [are] a recipe for endless litigation,
which would mean endless misery for children and adults alike”).
223. Id.
224. See id. at 205. Judge Smith explained that his proposed parentage rule would
be limited to female same-sex couples only:
I would leave for another day the question of what rules govern male couples,
for whom ADI [artificial donor insemination] is not possible. This limitation

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/10

34

Ball: Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases

2012]

ILLEGITIMACY IN FORMER PARTNER PARENTING CASES

657

For judges who prioritize certainty in parenting determinations, Judge
Smith’s proposed rule might still be unacceptable. This is because, under
that rule, there would still need to be a determination of whether
“knowledge and consent” were present and whether “extraordinary
circumstances” existed.225 (Judge Smith did not elaborate on the meaning
of either.) But for those who believe that certainty should not be the
normative polestar in parentage cases, Judge Smith’s rule is clearly an
improvement over the one adopted by the majority in Debra H. because it
would result in fewer instances of children being denied the legal,
economic, and emotional benefits of having a second parent.226
It is helpful to compare Judge Smith’s proposed rule not only to the one
adopted by the Debra H. majority, but also to the type of functional
parenthood test explicitly rejected by both the majority and by Judge
Smith.227 Although Judge Smith did not specifically label it as such, his
proposed test brings to mind intent-based understandings of parentage.228
may give some pause, for it seems intuitively that all people, male and female,
gay and straight, should be treated the same way. Yet it is an inescapable fact
that gay and straight couples face different situations, both as a matter of law
and as a matter of biology. By the choice of our Legislature, a choice we have
held constitutionally permissible, same-sex couples in New York have neither
marriage nor domestic civil unions available to them. And, pending even more
astounding technological developments than we have yet witnessed, it is not
possible for both members of a same-sex couple to become biological parents
of the same child. These differences seem to me to warrant different
treatment. Indeed, different treatment already exists, for both a statute and the
common law give a measure of protection to the children of married oppositesex couples who are conceived by ADI. The rule I propose would give the
children of lesbian couples similar, though not identical, protection.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
225. Judge Smith did not elaborate on the meaning of either criterion. Judge
Graffeo’s concurring opinion complained that Judge Smith’s proposed rule,
[l]ike the equitable estoppel test, . . . invites litigation over whether the parties
were “living together” (presumably, they must be living together in a romantic
relationship, not merely as roommates) at the time of insemination, whether
the insemination was “with the knowledge and consent” of the other partner,
and whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist, whatever those might be.
Under this set of factors, the same types of factual controversies that typify the
equitable estoppel analysis would ensue.
Id. at 199 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
226. I elaborate on the role that the prioritization of certainty over other
considerations in parentage rules plays in the creation of a new class of illegitimate
children in infra Part V.
227. See supra notes 94-101, 114-17 and accompanying text.
228. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity For Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323
(“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily
chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood.”); see also Jenni Millbank, The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian
Mother Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological Family, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y &
FAM. 149, 150 (2008) (“[I]t is the intention to have children together that is the essence
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By requiring that the child be conceived with the “knowledge and consent”
of the non-conceiving partner, Judge Smith suggested that if the partner
intended to become a parent, that is enough to legally recognize her as
such.229
One benefit of a parentage test that focuses on the parties’ intent at the
time of conception is that it avoids the factual inquiry, required by
functional parenthood tests, aimed at determining the extent and strength of
the relationship between the petitioner and the child.230 Although the need
to make such a determination has not, as claimed by the Debra H. court,231
led to extensive unpredictability and uncertainty in the case law,232 it is
nonetheless true that functional parenting hearings can be emotionally
charged and unpleasant affairs, especially when the legal parent seeks to
minimize the role played by the petitioner in the child’s life. As one
commentator has noted, it is common in these cases to
see birth mothers in court claiming that the co-mother, with whom they
jointly planned, conceived and raised a child, is an “aunty” or “extended
family member,” “family friend” or “significant other” in relation to the
child, or that she is a helpful source of former support to herself akin to a
“best friend,” “nanny” or “baby sitter;” but not in any way the child’s

of family formation.”).
229. Professor Jenni Millbank, while arguing in favor of “a form of automatic,
universal and stable legal recognition for co-mothers based on pre-conception
intention,” Millbank, supra note 228, at 163, calls for the adoption of a rule that is quite
similar to that proposed by Judge Smith in Debra H. According to Millbank, there
should be a “bright line presumption[]” that “[i]f two women are in a committed
cohabiting relationship (whether or not formalised) and the non-birth mother consents
to her partner’s attempt to conceive through assisted conception, she is the second
parent of the resulting child or children.” Id. at 165.
Professor Nancy Polikoff has praised two recent statutory enactments that incorporate,
in the area of assisted reproduction, an intent-based understanding of parenthood.
Polikoff explains that
[w]hen a lesbian couple decides to have a child, one woman commonly
conceives using donor semen. A statute delineating that her consenting partner
is also the child’s parent is a simple means of establishing her parentage, and
this is exactly what recent legislation in New Mexico and the District of
Columbia accomplishes. The D.C. legislation reads: “A person who consents
to the artificial insemination of a woman as provided in subparagraph (A) or
(B) with the intent to be the parent of her child, is conclusively established as a
parent of the resulting child.” The New Mexico statute reads: “A person
who . . . consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 7-704 . . .
with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child.”
Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. CIV.
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 233 (2009) (quoting D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2001) and
New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, 2009 N.M. LAWS 215 § 7-703).
230. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part III.B.
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other parent or other mother.233

There is much to be said for a parentage rule that renders unnecessary
allegations aimed at belittling the role of co-parents in children’s lives. At
the same time, however, there are limits to using pre-conception intent as
the dispositive criterion for establishing standing in former partner
parenting cases. First, the issue of intent may not always be clear; former
partners sometimes dispute each other’s account of the extent to which they
both agreed to be the child’s parents before conception.234 It therefore
makes sense, in cases in which there are conflicting claims of intent, to
expand the factual inquiry to include the intent and conduct of the parties
after the child’s birth. If, for example, the legal parent fostered and
encouraged the formation of a parent-child relationship between her partner
and the child, it would undermine her claim that the couple never intended
to raise the child jointly.
Indeed, this example suggests that it is problematic to view intent and
function as mutually exclusive criteria in determining parentage status.235
It seems highly relevant, in establishing a couple’s true intent, to determine
whether the party who lacks a biological or adoptive connection to the
child functioned as a parent with the legal parent’s consent and
encouragement. At the same time, courts that have embraced a functional
parenting approach have looked to considerations of intent by requiring, as
a threshold matter, that the legal parent have consented to and encouraged
the establishment of a parent-child relationship between the petitioner and
the child.236
This shows that functional parenthood, as currently

233. See Millbank, supra note 228, at 151 (footnotes omitted).
234. See, e.g., K.M. v E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Ca. 2005) (noting that one party

“testified that she and [her former lesbian partner] planned to raise the child together,
while [the partner] insisted that . . . [she] made it clear that her intention was to become
‘a single parent’”); V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000) (explaining that the
biological parent claimed that “she made the final decision to become pregnant
independently and before beginning her relationship with” her partner, while the latter
“claimed that the parties jointly decided to have children”).
235. See Millbank, supra note 228, at 150 (“Functional family and intentionality are
inter-related: shared intention and shared enterprise in planning a child and trying to
conceive is the platform on which the caring work of functional family is later built.”);
id. at 165 (“It is important to note that in the vast majority of lesbian-led families [prebirth] intentions as to the family form are followed through by actual family function
after birth, so intention and functionality are linked elements of a continuum rather than
dichotomous modes of recognition.”); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 640 (2002) (arguing that the concept of functional parenthood
should include “expressions of intention made before the child’s birth”).
236. See Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 435
(Wis. 1995) (stating that the first factor in the four-part functional parenthood test is
“that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child”).
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understood by courts, cannot exist without the requisite intent.237
A second limitation of a parentage rule such as the one proposed by
Judge Smith in his Debra H. concurrence is that it excludes individuals
who entered the picture after the child’s birth. The prioritization of intent
over function denies parentage to someone whose relationship with the
legal parent began after the child was born regardless of whether she
eventually established, with the legal parent’s consent and encouragement,
a parental relationship with the child.238 It is unlikely that a child under
237. The courts, in applying functional parenthood doctrines, have focused on the
legal parent’s intent rather than on that of the co-parent. There are at least two
explanations for why this has been the case. The first is the legal parent’s initial
constitutional right to determine who associates with her children. In applying
functional parenthood doctrines, courts have inquired whether the legal parent has
limited her constitutional rights by agreeing to have another individual serve as a coparent. As the Washington Supreme Court explained, “[c]ritical to our constitutional
analysis here, a threshold requirement for the status of the de facto parent is a showing
that the legal parent ‘consented to and fostered’ the parent-child relationship.” Carvin
v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005) (internal citation
and footnote omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court made a similar point when it
noted that
[t]he requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it places
control within his or her hands. That parent has the absolute ability to
maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child. However, if
she wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to
function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to that third party
parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the
child.
V.C., 748 A.2d at 552.
A second reason for the courts’ focus on the legal parents’ intent rather than on that of
their partners is that the latter’s intent can be gleaned from whether they chose to
function as parents. For these individuals, in other words, function is evidence of
intent. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (noting interrelationship
between function and intent in parentage status determination).
Interestingly Judge Smith’s proposed parentage rule focuses on the intent of the coparent rather than on that of the legal parent. See supra note 224 and accompanying
text. Professor Millbank has argued that this is the better approach because “the focus
of [the] inquiry [should] not [be] about the birth mother giving rights to the co-mother,
it [should be] about a shared enterprise undertaken by both women.” Millbank, supra
note 228, at 166. Millbank explains that, under this approach
[t]he birth mother’s intention is not irrelevant, rather it is presumed: she is
attempting to conceive while in a relationship with someone who will, almost
inevitably, undertake a significant share of parenting work with her, and so it is
presumed that she intends to share parental status. This does not prevent a
birth mother from having sole parental status if that is her true intention—but
this is no longer the baseline position, and must instead be explicitly chosen by
her. Such a birth mother would need to engage in a clear process in order to
exclude her partner from parental status. Equally, the birth mother’s partner
could refuse consent and avoid being ascribed parental status if she did not
wish to be a parent.
Id.
238. The New Jersey Supreme Court elaborated on this scenario as follows:
Although joint participation in the family’s decision to have a child is
probative evidence of the legally recognized parent’s intentions, not having
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these circumstances will consider the adult in question to be any less of a
parent—especially if she served in that capacity for an extended period of
time—than an individual who would qualify for parentage status under
Judge Smith’s proposed rule because she participated in the initial decision
to have the child.
In fact, it is unclear why the intent to become a parent should be legally
relevant only if it takes place before the child’s conception. Whether that
intent existed, and whether it was demonstrated through particular
understandings and conduct, would seem to be more important than its
precise timing (i.e., whether it was manifested before or after
conception).239
All of this suggests that a parentage rule that focuses exclusively on
intent might be appropriate when it can be shown that the couple made a
joint decision, prior to the insemination, that they would both be the child’s
parents, or alternatively, that only the biological parent would be a parent.
Yet, focusing only on pre-conception intent is not enough in cases where
the parties (1) have conflicting accounts of their joint intent or (2) began
their relationship after conception.
Considerations of functional
parenthood have a legitimate role to play in both of these scenarios. As a
result, intent-based parentage rules such as the one proposed by Judge
Smith should not be the sole mechanism through which parties who lack a
biological or adoptive link to a child are given the opportunity to show that
granting them custody and visitation would be in the child’s best interests.
participated in the decision does not preclude a finding of the third party’s
psychological parenthood. Such circumstances parallel the situation in which
a woman, already pregnant or a mother, becomes involved with or marries a
man who is not the biological or adoptive father of the child, but thereafter
fully functions in every respect as a father. There is nothing about that
scenario that would justify precluding the possibility of denominating that
person as a psychological parent.
V.C., 748 A.2d at 553.
Professor Melanie Jacobs has noted that intent-based parenting theories are inadequate
in cases where “the parties did not intend to coparent pre-birth, but actively coparented
the child for a period of time thereafter.” Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based
Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 438
(2005). Jacobs suggests that in those cases, “the initial intent should not be used to
preclude parentage determination and the current intent to coparent should be
considered as an element of functional parenthood.” Id. For her part, Jenni Millbank,
in defending an intent-based understanding of parenthood, “acknowledge[s] that roles
may alter or evolve in a positive and consensual manner after conception in a way not
anticipated by the [parties’] agreement. If disputes arise years later, it would be
antithetical to a functional family approach to formalistically hold people to an earlier
agreement that does not accord with their lived experience or actual relationships.”
Millbank, supra note 228, at 164-65.
239. See Jacobs, supra note 238, at 437 (“A . . . difficulty of the intent doctrine as
currently applied is that it focuses purely on pre-birth parenting intention; it does not
encompass the intent to parent that may accompany functional parenting that begins
after the child’s birth.”).
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V. CERTAINTY AND ILLEGITIMACY
In Part III, I questioned whether accounting for considerations other than
biology, adoption, and the existence of a legally recognized relationship in
assigning parentage status inevitably leads to unpredictability and
uncertainty in the determination of who qualifies for that status. There is
little evidence that it does. However, even if I am underestimating the
difficulty of applying multi-part functional parenthood tests, the rejection
of those tests on certainty and predictability grounds comes at the immense
cost of denying children the benefit of having a second parent. Indeed,
categorically denying a child a second parent in former partner parenting
cases is the contemporary equivalent of the past practice of denying socalled “illegitimate” children a legal relationship with their (unwed)
fathers.
Professor Harry Krause, in his influential 1967 article on the
unconstitutionality of the government’s differential treatment of
“illegitimate” children, explored and criticized several reasons for drawing
legal distinctions on legitimacy grounds.240 Interestingly, the first such
reason discussed by Krause related to certainty considerations. “It may be
argued,” he wrote, “that illegitimate birth furnishes less convincing
evidence of paternity than does birth in wedlock, or that illegitimate
paternity often cannot be established with the degree of certainty with
which a child of a marriage may be ascribed to his father.”241
240. Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477,
489-500 (1967). As Professor Nancy Polikoff has noted, “Krause took his ideas to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where children and parents harmed by the different status given
marital and nonmarital children invoked the Equal Protection Clause to argue that the
distinctions were unconstitutional.” Polikoff, supra note 229, at 210. Polikoff adds
that
Harry Krause also influenced the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to address the issue of nonmarital children.
His work led to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), written between 1969 and
1972. It was adopted in some form in nineteen states, and it greatly influenced
new laws in every state. In less than a decade, the legal doctrine of
“illegitimacy” had all but disappeared.
Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
241. Krause, supra note 240, at 489; see also Re M, [1955] 2 All E.R. 911, 912
(“The word ‘parent’ in an Act of Parliament does not include the father of an
illegitimate child, unless the context otherwise requires. . . . The father is too uncertain
a figure for the law to take any cognizance of him, except that it will make him pay for
the child’s maintenance if it can find out who he is. The law recognizes no rights in
him in regard to the child.”); Bartina L. Edwards, The Established Standard for Fathers
Who Have Acknowledged Paternity and Are Seeking Custody of Their Illegitimate
Child(ren): Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193 (2003), 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 116, 120 (2004)
(“The common-law [custody] presumption in favor of the mother of an illegitimate
child stems in part from an issue peculiar to the illegitimate child’s situation—
uncertainty as to the identity of the father of the child.”).
Professor Krause noted how improved scientific technologies were making it easier to
establish biological paternity, thus undermining the certainty-based justifications for
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The same focus on certainty is evident, as we have seen, in the New
York Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Debra H.242 Similar to the argument
that the assignation of parental rights and obligations were more certain and
predictable when children were born in wedlock, the New York Court of
Appeals now contends that biological and adoptive links, or, in their
absence, participation in legally recognized relationships, are essential
markers of parenthood because of the ease with which it is possible to
determine their existence.243 As in earlier times, this focus on certainty
helps render some children illegitimate.
The New York Court of Appeals’ role in creating a new class of
illegitimate children is at its clearest when it chose in Debra H. to
recognize the petitioner’s parentage status because she had entered into a
legally-recognized relationship (in her case, a civil union) with the child’s
legal parent.244 In prioritizing the certainty that comes with being able to
easily determine whether petitioners in parenting cases entered into legally
recognized relationships with legal parents over other considerations (such
as the actual relationship between the adults in question and the
children),245 the court disregarded the interests of children raised by couples
who are either unable or unwilling to have their relationships legally
recognized.
The rule adopted by the Debra H. court divided children who lack
biological or adoptive links to both of the individuals who care for them
into two categories: the privileged ones who get to keep both parents
because those parents had the opportunity and inclination to have their
relationships legally recognized, and the non-privileged children who,
through no fault of their own, miss out on the legal, financial, and
emotional benefits of having a second parent. It bears remembering that
the old legal regime that granted illegitimate children significantly fewer
benefits than legitimate ones similarly punished an entire class of children
for a condition—that of “illegitimacy”—that was no fault of their own.246
legal distinctions based on legitimacy grounds. Krause, supra note 240, at 490. He
also remarked that, because of sexual relationships by spouses outside of their
marriage, “there is nothing foolproof about birth in wedlock.” Id. at 491 (footnote
omitted).
242. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
245. I have argued here that the New York court’s use of the existence of a legally
recognized relationship as a marker of parentage status can be explained by its
normative prioritization of certainty over other considerations. See supra notes 105-10
and accompanying text.
246. See Matter of Hoffman, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 57 (App. Div. 1976) (“[T]he law will
not be required to discriminate against children labeled illegitimate through no fault of
their own.”).
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Yet, it is not only the part of Debra H. that deems the existence of a
legally recognized relationship between the adults to be determinative of
the parenthood question which effectively renders some children
illegitimate. When the Debra H. court reaffirmed Alison D.,247 it also
divided children who have parent-child relationships with two adults into
two classes: those who have biological or adoptive links with both adults
and those who have such links with only one. As Judge Smith explained in
his Debra H. concurrence, the application of Alison D. to cases in which
“couples make a commitment to bring a child into a two-parent family,”248
is problematic “not only [because it] disappoints the expectations of the
adults involved: much worse, it leaves each child with only one parent,
rendering the child, in effect, illegitimate.”249 Judge Smith added that “[t]o
apply the rule of Alison D. to [these] children . . . is to permit either
member of the couple to make the child illegitimate by her whim . . . .”250
The Court of Appeals in Debra H. seemed oblivious to the harm inflicted
on children who—again, through no fault of their own—are denied the
support of, and a relationship with, a second parent. Paradoxically, the
same court seemed acutely aware of the importance of having a second
parent a few years earlier when it grappled with the issue of second-parent
adoptions. In that context, the court recognized that the best interests of
children are
[a]dvanced in situations like those presented here by allowing the two
adults who actually function as a child’s parents to become the child’s
legal parents. The advantages which would result from such an adoption
include Social Security and life insurance benefits in the event of a
parent’s death or disability, the right to sue for the wrongful death of a
parent, the right to inherit under rules of intestacy and eligibility for
coverage under both parents’ health insurance policies. In addition,
granting a second parent adoption further ensures that two adults are
legally entitled to make medical decisions for the child in case of
emergency and are under a legal obligation for the child’s economic
support.
Even more important, however, is the emotional security of knowing
that in the event of the biological parent’s death or disability, the other
parent will have presumptive custody, and the children’s relationship
with their parents, siblings and other relatives will continue should the
coparents separate.251

247. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
248. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 204 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J.,

concurring).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
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In stark contrast, when the same court fifteen years later reaffirmed
Alison D. in Debra H., it concluded, in effect, that the benefits that
accompany bright-line rules in this area of the law outweigh the benefits to
children of having a second parent.252 The court was normatively wrong in
privileging certainty and predictability above all else, in the same way that
policymakers and courts were wrong in decades past in relying on certainty
considerations, among other factors, to render some children illegitimate
because their fathers were not married to their mothers.253
As noted in Part II, during the oral argument in Debra H., one of the
judges asked whether it was not “true that for many children it is better to
know the answer [of who their parents are] than what the answer is?”254
The logic behind this reasoning seeks to create a false dichotomy between
the predictability of the answer to the question of who a child’s parents are
and the specific content of that answer. Although it is undoubtedly true
that it is better for a child to know who his or her parents are than not to
know at all, that is not what is at issue in former partner parenting cases.
Those cases do not raise the question of whether the child has parents;
instead, the issue is who those parents are. In that context, having an

The Court in Debra H. pointed to the fact that New York law allows unmarried
partners of legal parents to adopt children they are helping raise as proof that there was
no pressing need to grant them other mechanisms through which to exercise parental
rights. See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190 n.2 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that “our subsequent
decision in Jacob softened any . . . ‘hard line’ [arising from Alison D.] by permitting
second-parent adoption”). The problem with this reasoning is that the adoption option
is a viable one only so long as the legal parent’s partner is (1) aware of her legal rights,
(2) has the financial ability to pursue an adoption, and (3) has the consent of the legal
parent to adopt. Adoption does not constitute a viable option for co-parents when any
one of these conditions is missing. See Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners:
Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle
for Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 46 (2006) (“There can be many reasons why
partners who can adopt choose not to. The question is whether the failure to adopt
reflects either lack of consent on the part of the legal parent, which . . . would seem to
be relevant, or a lack of interest or commitment on the part of the partner, which would
also seem germane.”); see also Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 186 (noting that the legal
parent “repeatedly rebuffed [her partner’s] requests to become [the child’s] second
parent by means of adoption.”); Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 204 (Smith J., concurring)
(noting that it “can[not] . . . be said that adoption by the nonbiological parent . . . is an
adequate recourse, for adoption is possible only by the voluntary act of the adopting
parent, with the consent of the biological one.”). Ultimately, as Deborah Forman has
argued, “[i]f we look at these cases from the children’s perspective, it becomes clear[]
that whether the partner adopted or not, the completion of a formal adoption seems
beside the point, especially if she functioned as a parent and developed the resulting
psychological attachment with the child.” Id. Or, as Nancy Polikoff succinctly puts it,
a mother should not have “to adopt her own child . . . .” Polikoff, supra note 229, at
267.
252. See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
254. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010)
(No. 10-441), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/
2010/Feb10/Feb10_OA.htm.
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answer is clearly not more important than the answer itself. If an adult has
functioned as a parent to a child for an extensive period of time, it is
reasonable for that child to consider him or her to be a parent, an
expectation which—as the New York Court of Appeals has recognized in
other contexts—needs to be protected in order to avoid harming the
child.255
Most children understand, from a very young age, who their parents are.
Indeed, that understanding is in place well before they comprehend the
legal implications of biological and adoptive links. Young children,
therefore, do not make distinctions between their legal and non-legal
parents. Since in the former partner parenting cases there is always at least
one legal parent, the relevant issue is not whether the child has a parent; the
issue is instead whether both individuals whom the child considers to be his
or her parents are recognized as such by the law (at least for some purposes
such as the opportunity to seek custody and visitation).256
In his article criticizing the law’s differential treatment of illegitimate
children, Professor Krause noted how the privileging of legitimacy was not
based on the actual relationships that fathers had with their children:
Whether living in a family setting or not, the legitimate child enjoys
broader rights against his father (whom he might never have seen) than
does the illegitimate (who might, in fact, live with his father and mother
in a permanent family-like situation.) Therefore, even if children might
reasonably be classified on the basis of whether they live and share their
lives with their fathers, the definition of these two groups by means of
255. Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N., 930 N.E.2d 214, 216-17 (N.Y. 2010); Shondel
J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 615-16 (N.Y. 2006); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
256. One of the limitations of functional parenthood doctrine is that, as Professor
Courtney Joslin notes, even when courts rely on it to grant the party lacking a
biological or adoptive link to the child standing to sue for custody and visitation, “he or
she may not be given the rights or responsibilities of a full legal parent, and the child’s
legal relationship with the second parent may not be clear or secure.” Joslin, supra
note 64, at 696. Professor Joslin adds that
[t]he significance of being an in loco, de facto, or psychological parent is
tremendously unclear. For example, is an in loco parent entitled to make
medical decisions regarding a child? Is the child entitled to child’s survivor
benefits if the in loco parent passes away? Is the child entitled to health
insurance through the de facto parent? There are a host of situations in which
rights and protections flow to a child through the existence of a legal-parent
child relationship. The child’s rights to these important protections is unclear
when the person is only entitled to protections under . . . equitable principles.
Id. One of the few courts that has explicitly recognized the “legal parity” between a de
facto or functional parent and a legal one is the Washington Supreme Court. See
Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (“[R]eason
and common sense support recognizing the existence of de facto parents and according
them the rights and responsibilities which attach to parents in this state.”); see also
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 12 A.3d 768, 780 (Vt. 2010) (noting that biological
mother’s former partner “was a legal parent of [child] and was entitled to all parental
rights flowing therefrom”).
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the criterion of birth in or out of wedlock is over-inclusive in that it
covers children who are legitimate but who do not live with their fathers
and under-inclusive in that it excludes illegitimates who do live with
their fathers.257

The same kind of over- and under-inclusivity results from the application
of a rule that uses the existence of biological or adoptive links between the
adult and the child, or of a legal relationship between the two adults, as a
necessary pre-condition for the granting of parentage status. The rule is
overinclusive because it affords legal protections to children even in
circumstances in which the adults in question play no meaningful roles in
their lives. And it is underinclusive because it denies protections to
children who have established parent-child bonds with individuals who are
unable to meet the courts’ bright-line rules aimed at promoting certainty.
In the end, the problem with the categorical application of bright-line
rules in determining standing in parenting cases is that they do not allow
for the type of flexibility needed to account for the many different ways in
which individuals in our time assume the responsibilities of parenthood.
Even if most children have biological or adoptive links to all of the adults
who function as their parents, that still leaves many children for whom that
is not the case. The latter children do not have any fewer needs for the
emotional and financial support of all of their parents than do the former.
Finally, it bears noting that although bright-line rules, by definition,
eschew flexible ones, the opposite, at least in the context of parenting
cases, is not true. The doctrine of functional parenthood does not displace
the bright-line rules related to the existence of biological or adoptive links,
or of a legally-recognized relationship between the adults. The application
of the doctrine, in other words, does not prevent courts from using biology,
adoption, and the entering into legally-recognized relationships as means
through which to grant parentage status. Instead, the doctrine serves as an
alternative means of acquiring that status, one that recognizes the diversity
of American families at the beginning of the twenty-first century without
jeopardizing the ability of the majority of individuals to be recognized as
257. Krause, supra note 240, at 495. Those who defended the privileging of
legitimate children might have done so based on concerns that unwed fathers were less
likely than wed ones to play a meaningful role in the children’s lives. It bears noting
that even if we were to concede for purposes of argument that this concern was a
reasonable one in the context of unwed biological fathers, it has little applicability in
former partner parenting cases. Far from representing instances of absent parents, these
cases instead usually involve individuals who have played an ongoing and extensive
parental role in the children’s lives. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67, 2011
WL 553923, *7 (Feb. 17, 2011) (noting the finding by circuit court that the nonbiological mother “cared for the child’s every need every day for three and one-half
years . . . fed, bathed, clothed, nurtured, supervised, and supported [the child], and
performed every other act a parent would do for their child”); In re Parentage of L.B.,
122 P.3d at 164 (recognizing how the non-biological mother shared parenting
responsibilities with the biological mother).
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parents through the application of bright-line rules.
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that considerations of certainty in the
determination of who is a parent are not enough to justify categorically
denying individuals who have functioned as parents—with the consent and
encouragement of legal parents—the opportunity to demonstrate that
granting them custody and visitation rights would be in the children’s best
interests. In doing so, I have tried to show that concerns expressed by
some judges regarding the unpredictability and unworkability of the
doctrine of functional parenthood are overblown. That doctrine, I have
argued here, has an important role to play in the allocation of parental
rights. I have also explained how the application of the doctrine, by
assuring children the emotional and financial support of a second parent,
avoids the perils of creating a new class of illegitimate children.
It may seem at first blush that the recognition of same-sex marriage can
resolve most, if not all, of the issues that I have addressed in this Article.
After all, an important reason why the doctrine of functional parenthood
has been at issue in so many former same-sex partner parenting cases is
because same-sex couples have traditionally been unable to marry and have
therefore been unable to benefit from the parentage presumption that
accompanies marriage.258 Now that some states, including New York,259
have recognized same-sex marriage, individuals residing in those
jurisdictions who lack biological or adoptive links to the children in
question, but who were married to the legal parents at the time of
conception or birth, should be able to use the marriage to establish their
parental status.260 If the New York Court of Appeals in Debra H., for
example, was willing to recognize the petitioner’s parental status based on
her Vermont civil union with the legal parent,261 then New York courts will
presumably be willing to do the same for future petitioners who married
their same-sex partners under New York law but who lack biological or
adoptive links to the children.
But there will be some same-sex couples who, like some different-sex
258. For a discussion of the marital parentage presumption (also known as the
legitimacy presumption) at a time when same-sex couples are increasingly visible, see
Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy
in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2006).
259. Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1.
260. See Polikoff, supra note 229, at 215 (noting that in states that recognize samesex marriage, as well as in those that have civil unions or comprehensive domestic
partnership laws, the presumption of parentage that accompanies marriage should apply
to “a female spouse or domestic/civil union partner of a woman who bears a child”).
261. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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ones, decide to have children outside of marriage. This reality brings us
back full circle to the question of illegitimacy. If we make marriage a
precondition for the recognition of the parental status of lesbians and gay
men who lack biological or adoptive links to children, we risk making the
same error in the context of same-sex couples that we made in earlier
decades in the context of heterosexual ones, that is, of recognizing a second
parental figure in a child’s life based on whether that individual was
married to the child’s legal parent.
Even if society prefers that parents be married, it is a policy preference
that should not be pursued at the expense of the children of unmarried
parents.262 It took our country a long time to recognize, in the context of
heterosexual relationships, that depriving so-called illegitimate children of
benefits is not an appropriate or just way of promoting births in wedlock.263
We should be careful not to repeat the same mistake in the context of samesex relationships.

262. As Nancy Polikoff has noted, the State of Louisiana in the 1960s argued that
“[s]uperior rights of legitimate offspring are inducements or incentives to parties to
contract marriage, which is preferred by Louisiana as the setting for producing
offspring.” Polikoff, supra note 229, at 210 (quoting Brief for the Attorney General,
State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)). The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that it was unconstitutional to deny benefits to
illegitimate children based solely on their mothers’ marital status. Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (“Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely
because of his birth out of wedlock?”).
263. See Polikoff, supra note 229, at 231 (“Since Harry Krause’s transformative
efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, the guiding tenet of parentage law reform has been
equality for children born to married and unmarried parents.”) (footnote omitted).
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